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 THE US REJECTION OF THE COMPOSITE PROTOCOL :  
A HUGE MISTAKE BASED ON ILLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS 
 
by Graham S. Pearson*, Malcolm R. Dando§ & Nicholas A. Sims  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  The 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) opened on Monday 23 July 2001.  This was just days after the G8 
Foreign Ministers had announced in their communiqué1 on Thursday 19 July 2001 that: 
 
With a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international 
security  in the face of the challenges of the 21st century, we place great importance 
on the existing regimes of multilateral treaties and export control arrangements 
designed to cope with the threats that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery can pose.  In this context we welcome efforts 
to strengthen international arms control and non-proliferation regime and reaffirm 
our determination to promote compliance with and the universality of the 
fundamental treaties related to weapons of mass destruction.... 
 
and specifically stated in regard to the BTWC that: 
 
We welcome efforts to agree on measures, including potential enforcement and 
compliance measures to strengthen the BTWC.  We remain fully committed to pursue 
efforts to ensure that the BTWC is an effective instrument to counter the growing 
threat of biological weapons. 
 
2.  The Ad Hoc Group session opened with plenary statements on Monday and Tuesday 23 
and 24 July 2001 on behalf of over 50 of the approximately 55 States engaged in the 
negotiation of the Protocol that the Chairman's composite Protocol text should form the 
basis for the political decisions to adopt the Protocol before the Fifth Review Conference 
later this year.  On the morning of Wednesday 25 July, a further two States Parties spoke in 
support of the Protocol. 
 
3.  The United States then spoke saying that "After extensive deliberation, the United States 
has concluded that the current approach to a Protocol to the Biological Weapons 
Convention,...is not, in our view, capable of achieving the mandate set forth for the Ad Hoc 
Group, strengthening confidence in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention."  
They went on to say that "We believe the objective of the mandate was and is important to 
international security, we will therefore be unable to support the current text, even with 
changes, as an appropriate outcome of the Ad Hoc Group efforts." 
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4.  This Evaluation Paper examines the United States statement in detail and analyses its 
various elements.  It is concluded that these elements and arguments are based on illogical 
assessments and are incorrect and not valid.  Several are based on alleged concerns that have 
no basis in the actual composite Protocol text.  It is evident that the United States is indeed 
making a "stunning" mistake2 and is failing to take all possible steps to strengthen the 
international norm totally prohibiting biological weapons and to obstruct the proliferation of 
biological weapons.  The United States is urged to urgently reconsider its position.  The 
other States Parties to the BTWC are urged to complete the negotiation of the Protocol this 
year whilst urging the United States to reconsider and to recognize that the Protocol does 
indeed achieve the mandate agreed by the United States and the other States Parties at the 
Special Conference3 in 1994, thereby substantially strengthening the international biological 
weapons prohibition and proliferation regimes. 
 
The United States Statement 
 
5.  This ten page statement of 25 July 2001 has seven sections preceded by an introduction 
and followed by a conclusion: 
 
a.  Introduction 
b.  Objectives 
c.  The Paradigm 
d.  Biodefense Issues 
e.  On-Site Activity Utility 
f.  Constitutional and Ratification Issues 
g.  Export Controls 
h.  Disturbing Negotiation Positions 
i.  Conclusion 
 
This analysis considers each of these sections in turn.  For clarity, the particular language 
from the statement that is evaluated is reproduced in bold italics. 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
6.  This asserts that "no nation is more committed than the United States to combating the 
BW threat."  Indeed, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and the Russian 
Federation, are the co-Depositaries of the BTWC with the special political responsibilities 
that such status brings.  An evaluation4 of the Article addressing the Depositary in the rolling 
text of the Protocol provides further information.  For over a decade, the United States has 
made repeated strong statements about the dangers from biological weapons and the 
importance of combating this danger.   Thus, almost 15 years ago, President George H.W. 
                                                 
2Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Allergic Reaction:  Washington's Response to the BWC Protocol, Arms Control 
Today, July/August 2001, pp.3-8. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07_08/rosenbergjul_aug01 
.asp?print 
3United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva 19-30 September 1994, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 1994. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
4Graham S. Pearson and Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXII:  Depositary/ies, University of Bradford, Department of 
Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper No 7, September 1999. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
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Bush addressed5 the General Assembly saying that "But as always, questions of war and 
peace must be paramount to the United Nations.  We must move forward to limit and 
eliminate weapons of mass destruction." and going on to say  "We have not entered into an 
era of perpetual peace.  The threat to peace that nations face may today be changing, but 
they have not vanished.  In fact, in a number of regions around the world, a dangerous 
combination is now emerging: regimes armed with old and unappeasable animosities and 
modern weapons of mass destruction.  That development will raise the stakes whenever war 
breaks out."[Emphasis added]  A year later in October 1990, President George H.W. Bush 
again spoke6 to the General Assembly shortly after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq saying that  
"We must also redouble our efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, biological 
weapons and the ballistic missiles that can rain destruction on distant peoples." After the 
Gulf war, in September 1991, President George H.W. Bush spoke7 to the General Assembly 
stressing the challenges of building peace and prosperity in a world leavened by the end of 
the Cold War and the resumption of history.  He said "The renewal of history also imposes an 
obligation to remain vigilant about new threats and old.  We must expand our efforts to 
control nuclear proliferation.  We must work to prevent the spread of chemical and 
biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them."[Emphasis added] 
 
7.  Some four months later in January 1992, when the Security Council met for the first time 
at the level of Heads of State and Government level, President George H.W. Bush 
represented the United States and joined in the statement issued at the end of the meeting that 
said8 that "The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.  The members of the Council commit themselves to 
working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such 
weapons and to take appropriate action to that end."[Emphasis added] 
 
8.  The Clinton administration continued in the same vein with further strong statements to 
the General Assembly.  In 1996, President Clinton said9 that the United States had six priority 
goals to further lift the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction, and to limit their dangerous spread saying that ".... we must better protect 
our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war, by giving the biological 
weapons convention the means to strengthen compliance, including on-site investigations 
when we believe such weapons may have been used or when suspicious outbreaks of disease 
occur.  We should aim to complete this task by 1998."[Emphasis added]  
 
9.  Similar concerns were echoed in 1994 by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the North Atlantic Council meeting who in their final communiqué stated10 that 
"Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat 
                                                 
5United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fourth Meeting, Monday 25 September 
1989 at 10 am, A/44/PV.4, 25 September 1989. 
6United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, Monday 1 
October 1990 at 9.30 am, A/45/PV.14, 5 October 1990. 
7United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fourth Meeting, Monday 23 September 
1991 at 10 am, A/46/PV.4, 25 September 1991. 
8United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council,  S/23500 dated 31 January 
1992. 
9United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting, Tuesday 24 September 
1996 at 10 am, A/51/PV.6, 24 September 1996. 
10NATO, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994,  Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 
January 1994.  Available at http://www.nato.int 
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to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO.  We have decided to intensify 
and expand NATO’s political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account 
the work already under way in other international fora and institutions.  In this regard, we 
direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall 
policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce 
the proliferation threat and protect against it."[Emphasis added]   Six months later, an 
Alliance policy framework was issued11 on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
This stated that "Current international efforts focus on the prevention of WMD and missile 
proliferation through a range of international treaties and regimes.  The most important 
norm-setting treaties are the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the chemical weapons 
convention (CWC) and the biological and toxin weapons convention (BTWC).  .... The 
BTWC can be strengthened through efforts in the field of transparency and verification.  The 
Allies fully support these efforts." [Emphasis added]. 
 
10.  More recently, the US has been party to strong commitments to the Protocol notably in 
the Washington Summit Communiqué12 of 24 April 1999 when the NATO Heads of State 
and Government said that "We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding 
protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote 
transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention."   This was reiterated in the NATO Ministerial meeting in May 2000 when the 
communiqué13 stated that "We continue to attach the utmost importance to full 
implementation of and compliance with international disarmament and non-proliferation 
regimes.  As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), we continue to regard as a matter of priority the 
conclusion of negotiations on appropriate measures, including possible verification 
measures and proposals to strengthen the convention, to be included as appropriate in a 
legally binding instrument.  We reiterate our commitment to efforts to achieve such an 
instrument as soon as possible before the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001." 
[Emphasis added].  This was reiterated using essentially identical language14 in the next 
Ministerial meeting in December 2000. This commitment was also affirmed in the G8 Final 
Communiqué15 in Okinawa in July 2000, which said that "We commit ourselves to work with 
others to conclude the negotiations on the Verification Protocol to strengthen the Biological 
Weapons Convention as early as possible in 2001."     
 
11.  More recently still, President George W. Bush in his inaugural address16 in January 2001 
said that "We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new 
                                                 
11NATO, Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons Of Mass Destruction, issued at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Istanbul, Turkey on 9 June 1994, Press Release M-
NAC-1(94)45, 9 June 1994. Available at http://www.nato.int 
12Washington Summit Communiqué, An Alliance for the 21st Century, issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999.  
Available at http://www.nato.int/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm 
13Final Communiqué, ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Florence on 24 May 2000.  
Available at http://www.nato.int/pr/2000/p00-052e.htm 
14Final Communiqué, ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters on 14 and 
15 December 2000.  Available at http://www.nato.int/pr/2000/p00-124e.htm 
15G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000, 23 July 2000. Available at http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp 
16The White House, President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address, 20 January 2001.  Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/press/text/inaugural-address.html 
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horrors."  Three weeks later, he said in an address17 to an audience including NATO 
ambassadors that "...we must prepare our nations against the dangers of a new era.  The 
grave threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has not gone away with the 
Cold War.  It has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder 
to answer.  And the adversaries seeking these tools of terror are less predictable, more 
diverse....We have no higher priority than the defense of our people against terrorist attack.  
To succeed, America knows that we must work with our allies.  We did not prevail together 
in the Cold War only to go our separate ways, pursuing separate plans with separate 
technologies."[Emphasis added].  As recently as June 2001 prior to a visit to Europe he said18 
that "Our United States and our allies ought to develop the capacity to address the true 
threats of the 21st century.  The true threats are biological and information warfare." 
 
12.  The introduction to the US statement to the Ad Hoc Group rightly stresses the 
importance of countering this complex and dangerous threat from biological weapons with 
a full range of effective instruments -- non-proliferation, export controls, domestic 
preparedness, and counterproliferation.  These all form part of the comprehensive web of 
deterrence that we have argued strongly is the vital counter to the proliferation of biological 
weapons.19  However, as we noted in Evaluation Paper No 2120 in July 2001: 
 
The Protocol is also important for its contribution to the web of deterrence which 
comprises: 
 
• A strong international and national prohibition regime reinforcing the norm 
that biological weapons are totally prohibited 
 
• Broad international and national controls on the handling, storage, use and 
transfer of dangerous pathogens 
 
• Preparedness including both active and passive protective measures and 
response plans that have been exercised 
 
• Determined national and international response to any use or threat of use 
of biological weapons ranging from diplomatic sanctions through to armed 
intervention, 
 
which are together mutually reinforcing and lead a would-be possessor, whether a 
"rogue State" or a non-State actor to judge that acquisition and use of BW would not 
be valuable, would be detected and incur an unacceptable penalty.   Any single 
element of the web of deterrence alone is insufficient -- all elements are vital and all 
need to be strengthened as they thereby reinforce the deterrent effect.  The Protocol 
                                                 
17The White House, Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel, Norfolk Naval Air Station, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 13 February 2001.  Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010213-1.html 
18The White House, Remarks by the President in Tax Celebration Event, Barrett Farm, Dallas Center, Iowa, 8 
June 2001.  Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010608-2.html 
19See, for example, Graham S. Pearson, The Vital Importance of the Web of Deterrence, Sixth International 
Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Proceedings, Stockholm, 10 - 15 
May 1998, pp. 23-31.  Graham S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of 
Deterrence, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp.145 - 162. 
20Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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through its strengthening of the international prohibition regime not only reinforces 
the norm that biological weapons are totally prohibited, its requirements also 
strengthen the international and national controls on the handling, storage, use and 
transfer of dangerous pathogens and the determined  international response to any 
use or threat of use of biological weapons.   In other words, the Protocol contributes 
to the strengthening of all the elements of the web of deterrence.   
 
13.  The introduction goes on to say that the United States has had serious issues with both 
individual proposals and the general approaches to some issues throughout the Protocol 
negotiations.  In analysing the Working Papers submitted to the Ad Hoc Group it is evident 
that the US has been far from the forefront of the negotiations in putting forward new ideas 
and proposals.  Table 1 shows that the US has put forward some 16 Working Papers out of 
the total of over 450 -- or about 3.5% -- in marked contrast to the 44 (or 10%) submitted by 
the UK and 27 (or 6%) submitted by the Russian Federation , the other two codepositaries of 
the BTWC and far below the 78 (or 17%) submitted by South Africa. 
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14.  A more detailed examination of those working papers submitted by the United States is 
made in Table 2. 
 
WP  
No 
Date Pages Title Content 
AHG
/23 
13 Jul 95 2 Discussion of potential 
Article X issues 
Sets out issues to be 
considered in regard to the 
implementation of Article X 
25 1 Dec 95 3 Computer Networking as a 
means of Strengthening the 
BWC 
Proposes computer 
networking as a means of 
implementing Article X 
73 17 Jul 96 4 The role of epidemiology in 
unusual/suspicious outbreaks 
of disease 
CDC paper addressing how 
epidemiologists investigate 
unusual disease outbreaks 
176 21 Jul 97 2 Preamble Proposes language for 
Preamble 
285 24 Jun 98 1 Article III. Investigations Proposes language relating to 
field investigations 
294 9 Jul 98 3 Proposed elements of 
clarification visits 
Proposes outline for 
clarification visits 
296 10 Jul 98 2 WP by 29 States Parties Reaffirms commitment to 
Protocol comprising 
declarations, visits, 
investigations & organization 
306 15 Sep 98 1  Amended language for 
vaccine production facilities 
314 24 Sep 98 3 Proposed text for Art III. F.III 
Investigations G 
Proposes language on access 
and measures to guard against 
abuse during investigations 
319  2 Oct 98 4 Proposed text for Art III 
Declarations Current 
Biological Defence 
Declaration 
Proposes detailed language 
and definitions for 
declarations on current 
biological defence activities 
and facilities 
320 5 Oct 98 2 Proposed Text for App F List 
of Agents and Toxins 
Proposes a list of human, 
animal and plant pathogens 
348 20 Jan 99 3 Determination of, and 
modification to, Field 
Investigation Area(s) 
Proposes amendments 
regarding areas to be 
investigated in field 
investigations 
378 29 Jun 99 2 Art III D. Declarations 
Annual Declarations (C) 
Currrent Defensive 
Programmes 
Proposes further language for 
declarations of current 
defensive programmes 
396 26 Jul 99 2 Joint WP with UK Proposes amendments for Art 
III G Investigation of disease 
outbreaks 
 
9 
 
WP  
No 
Date Pages Title Content 
410 10 Dec 99 3 Proposed changes to 
clarification visits 
Proposes amendments to text 
regarding clarification visits  
436 11 Dec 00 6 Impact on Declarations, 
Visited State Party, and 
Receiving State party when a 
Host Nation is involved 
Proposes amendments to text 
regarding definitions and 
declarations relating to 
situations involving a host 
nation 
441 22 Feb 01 5 Investigations  Proposes language for various 
paragraphs in Art III.G and 
Annex C. II and C. III  
442 23 Feb 01 3 Annex C II Field 
Investigations 
Proposes language for 
sampling and identification in 
field and facility 
investigations 
 
This shows that the principal areas in which the United States has submitted working papers 
are those related to Article X measures, investigations, clarification visits and declarations of 
biological defence activities.  The above working papers do not, however, give any sense of a 
State Party which is constantly reiterating a dissatisfaction with the approach adopted by the 
Protocol as is asserted in the United States statement of 25 July 2001.  
 
15.  It is also well known that the United States has frequently requested a weakening of these 
provisions of the Protocol because of concerns about their implications for the United States.  
If the United States indeed still has serious substantive difficulties with the provisions in the 
Protocol -- which have not changed substantively since the Ad Hoc Group transitioned in July 
1997 to consideration of a rolling text as all the elements in that rolling text are still in the 
Chairman's composite Protocol text -- one would have expected the United States to have 
submitted working papers explaining why it has these difficulties and proposing solutions to 
overcome them. 
 
16.  The statement goes on to assert that the United States has new, affirmative ideas for 
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention.  No indication is, however, given of 
these ideas and it seems unlikely that there are indeed new practicable ideas that have not 
been considered during the past decade -- either during the VEREX process in which the 
national experts from all States Parties sought to identify all possible measures or during the 
Ad Hoc group negotiations when the diplomats and experts from over 50 States Parties have 
grappled with devising an effective and efficient Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and 
improve the implementation of the Convention. 
 
17.  Although the US statement says that "We believe that we can strengthen the Biological 
Weapons Convention through multilateral arrangements", in rejecting the Protocol the 
United States is ignoring the reality that it has taken 10 years of multilateral negotiation by 
over 50 States Parties to reach this point when a Protocol is within reach.  There is no 
prospect in the foreseeable future of any alternative multilateral arrangement that would be 
more effective than the Chairman's composite Protocol.  The Australia Group, sometimes 
mistakenly proposed as a substitute, is a limited plurilateral grouping, lacking the fuller 
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multilateral character of the Ad Hoc group and of the organization that will be created by the 
Protocol.  As is made clear in paragraph 26 below, it is not a multilateral arrangement. 
 
18.  The statement recognizes the substantive and political values many of the participants 
in the Ad Hoc Group attach to successful completion of the Protocol.  It is evident that the 
United States does not share this widespread appreciation even though Ambassador Don 
Mahley in testimony two weeks earlier to a US Congressional subcommittee stated that "If 
there is no sense during the Fifth Review Conference in November that a Protocol ... is in 
sight, we can expect a very troublesome Review Conference..." and went on to say that "This 
is another factor that the United States will take into consideration in its approach to the 
Protocol." 
 
19.  The principal conclusion stated in the introduction to the US statement that "the current 
approach to a Protocol is not, in our view, capable of achieving the mandate set forth for 
the Ad Hoc Group..." requires careful consideration of the mandate and an evaluation of the 
extent to which the composite Protocol text achieves the mandate.  Bradford Briefing Paper 
No 2521 in September 1999 examines the mandate to identify appropriate criteria against 
which  the individual elements of the emerging Protocol could be evaluated, considers 
whether there are additional criteria which need to be included and then addresses why the 
CWC regime is relevant to the emerging BTWC Protocol regime before providing a 
comparative evaluation of both the emerging Protocol and the existing CWC regime against 
these criteria.   It is concluded that the current draft Protocol contains the essential elements 
for a reliable and effective integrated regime.  This evaluation was against the following 
criteria: 
 
Applicability (to all relevant facilities and activities) 
Protection of CPI (commercial proprietary information) 
Protection of NSN (legitimate national security needs) 
Avoid negative impact (on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial 
 development) 
Reliable 
Cost-effective 
Non-discriminatory 
Non-intrusive (as possible consistent with effective implementation) 
Non-abuse 
Promotion of Protocol universality 
Increased transparency 
Enhanced confidence in compliance 
Deter non-compliance 
 
20.  In Briefing Paper No 25 the overall evaluation was summarised in a Table reproduced 
here for ease of reference.   
                                                 
21Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, The Emerging Protocol:  An Integrated Reliable and Effective 
Regime, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 25, September 1999. 
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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21.  The overall conclusions of Briefing Paper No 25 were: 
 
44.   The BTWC Protocol regime can thus be considered in the round and compared 
with the CWC regime.   The Protocol declarations will be considerably less onerous 
than those for the CWC as only tens of facilities will need to be declared in a typical 
developed country such as those in Europe.   No CPI information will be required yet 
the facilities to be declared will be selected to be those of particular relevance.    The 
provisions for ensuring the submission of declarations have no parallel in the CWC 
regime and should be effective in ensuring that States Parties to the Protocol comply 
with their obligations.   The declaration follow-up procedures with infrequent 
randomly-selected/transparency visits will ensure that declarations are accurate with 
the potential for extension of such visits to provide advice and technical cooperation 
providing a useful bonus for States Parties.   The declaration clarification 
procedures, ranging from written correspondence through a consultative meeting to, 
if necessary, a clarification visit, will ensure that declarations are complete and 
accurate.   Both of these are developments from the CWC regime and should ensure 
that the Protocol regime is more reliable.   Investigations are always going to be 
highly political in nature and consequently extremely rare events.   They are, 
however, vital elements of the overall regime.   The specific Protocol provisions for 
implementation of Article X of the BTWC go far beyond the comparable provisions in 
the CWC -- and will contribute both to the promotion of universality of the Protocol 
and to the increasing of transparency and the building of confidence in compliance. 
 
45.   All in all, the BTWC Protocol is being crafted so that it will achieve the 
requirement for an effective and reliable regime which, in accordance with the AHG 
mandate, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation  of the 
BTWC and thereby strengthen the norm against biological weapons.  
 
None of the subsequent developments in arriving at the Chairman's composite Protocol text 
changes this evaluation. 
 
22.  The US statement continues to say that "Our overarching concern is the inherent 
difficulty of crafting a mechanism suitable to address the unique biological weapons 
threat" and that the traditional approach that has worked well for many other types of 
weapons "is not a workable structure for biological weapons".    If this is indeed the case, 
one has to ask why the United States agreed to the conclusions of the Special Conference in 
1994 at which Don Mahley said22 in regard to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group that: 
 
First, the commitments contained in the Convention, especially the obligations in 
Article I, were fully valid and must remain unchanged.  The United States would 
strongly oppose any effort to amend the Convention, but it fully supported the 
preparation of a protocol containing a regime to strengthen it.  Secondly,...all 
measures included in the protocol should be mandatory and legally binding.  The 
measures set forth in the protocol should help strengthen the Convention by 
establishing an official benchmark for identifying discrepancies or ambiguities 
pertaining to facilities or activities and for seeking clarification, providing a 
mechanism for pursuing specific activities of concern and allowing for direct 
                                                 
22United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva 19-30 September 1994, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 1994.   See Part IV, pages 88-89. 
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diplomatic engagement to resolve compliance concerns.  Thirdly, the ad hoc 
committee should focus on developing a legally binding regime based on the 
measures proposed by VEREX Group and the conclusions as reported to the States 
parties.  Fourthly, the selection process should consider both off-site measures, such 
as mandatory declarations, and on-site measures, such as facility visits, providing a 
solid foundation for the verification regime. [Emphasis added] 
 
In addition, the United States in Working Paper 1023 submitted to the Special Conference 
proposed a mandate for the Ad Hoc Group which "shall be to draft a protocol that provides 
for a regime with the following basic elements: 
 
• The regime shall build upon measures such as those contained in the VEREX Final 
Report, plus any additional new measures the Group believes necessary. 
 
• The regime should be mandatory and legally binding. 
 
• The regime should provide or enhance openness and transparency of activities 
relevant to the BWC for all stages of potential biological and toxin warfare activities, 
from research through production, stockpiling, and weaponization. 
 
• The regime should include off-site and on-site measures, including short-notice on-
site measures. 
 
• Any on-site measures should be designed to, among other things, strengthen 
confidence in information exchanged among States Parties or provide a mechanism 
for pursuing specific activities of concern. 
 
• The regime should include commercial, academic and government facilities as 
legitimate potential objects of investigation, bearing in mind that all activities to 
strengthen confidence in compliance must include appropriate means to protect 
proprietary information, constitutional rights, and sensitive national security 
information not related to biological and toxin weapons activity. 
 
•  Activities associated with implementation of the regime should rely on existing 
organizational resources where possible to minimize costs, consistent with technical 
requirements.  Efficient timely operation should be an important consideration in 
designing the regime. 
 
All of these proposals for the mandate were eventually incorporated into the mandate for the 
Ad Hoc Group agreed by the Special Conference.   
 
23.  At the Fourth Review Conference in November 1996, John D. Holum leading the US 
delegation which included Don Mahley as the Deputy Representative stated24: 
 
                                                 
23United States of America, Consideration of VEREX Report, Working Paper 10 in United Nations, Special 
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva 19-30 
September 1994, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 1994.   See Part III, pages 36-37. 
24United States, Remarks of the Hon. John D. Holum, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 26 November 1996. 
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Of course, the most potent vehicle for strengthening the Convention is the Ad Hoc 
Group, established independently more than two years ago by a Special Conference 
of the States Parties....The Ad Hoc Group thus can bring the Convention into the 
1990s, through a legally binding compliance protocol that provides for new off-site 
and on-site activities. 
 
The protocol should strengthen compliance by making certain national information 
declarations mandatory -- a matter already debated thoroughly. 
 
The Ad Hoc group should build upon the voluntary confidence building measures... 
 
It is interesting, in the light of the United States statement of 25 July 2001 to recall how John 
Holum concluded his remarks to the Fourth Review Conference: 
 
Arms control and science have given us means no less modern to combat them.  But 
we must marshal great will and wisdom to do so. The choices we make here will be 
fateful. 
 
We can wait for tragedy -- for biological weapons to surpass what other weapons 
have done in Tokyo, Oklahoma City, or the Gulf War. 
 
We can haggle -- playing international politics as usual, and subordinating security 
to barter. 
 
Or we can act -- first with prudence, to protect the Convention, then with boldness 
and statesmanship, to make it stronger. 
 
I know we will choose this third path -- not just to renounce these weapons, but 
finally to banish them from the earth. [Emphasis added] 
 
24.  Moreover, the United States was one of the 29 States who joined in July 1998, a year 
after the Ad Hoc Group had transitioned to negotiation of the rolling text of the Protocol, in 
submitting Working Paper No. 29625 to the Ad Hoc Group.  This stated that "the above States 
Parties consider that the measures to strengthen compliance should include, inter alia, the 
following elements, and that discussion on these should focus on ensuring their efficiency, 
practicality and cost effectiveness.  They include: 
 
- Declarations of a range of facilities and activities of potential relevance under the 
Convention, inter alia, so as to enhance transparency; 
 
- Provisions for visits to facilities in order to promote accurate and complete 
declarations and thus further enhance transparency and confidence; 
 
- Provision for rapid and effective investigations into concerns over non-compliance, 
including both facility and field investigations; and 
 
                                                 
25Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States, Working 
Paper, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.296, 10 July 1998.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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- A cost-effective and independent organization, including a small permanent staff, 
capable of implementing the Protocol effectively." 
 
The Working Paper concludes by stating that "They [the above States Parties] call upon the 
Ad Hoc Group as a whole to demonstrate leadership by intensifying its efforts towards the 
successful and early adoption of a legally-binding Protocol that will address the global 
threat posed by biological and toxin weapons."  The language in the US statement of 25 July 
2001 is totally illogical when considered against this background.. 
 
25.  The US statement goes on to state that "We believe the objective of the mandate was 
and is important to international security, we will therefore be unable to support the 
current text, even with changes, as an appropriate outcome of the Ad Hoc Group efforts."  
Given that the mandate was agreed by the United States and contained the proposals made by 
the United States, the composite Protocol text should be evaluated against the mandate -- and 
if this is done, then there is no doubt at all -- as shown in paragraphs 19 to 21 above -- that the 
composite Protocol text does indeed successfully meet the objective of the mandate. 
 
26.  The US statement continues to say that the United States intends to develop other ideas 
and different approaches that we believe could help to achieve our common objective of 
effectively strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention.  As already noted in 
paragraph 16 above, no indication is, however, given of these ideas and it seems unlikely that 
there are indeed new practicable ideas that have not been considered during the past decade -- 
either during the VEREX process in which the national experts from all States Parties sought 
to identify all possible measures or during the Ad Hoc group negotiations when the diplomats 
and experts from over 50 States Parties have grappled with devising an effective and efficient 
Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.      
 
27.  In the United States, there has been some consideration earlier this year in a House of 
Representatives subcommittee26 of possible alternatives to the Protocol.  These additional 
mechanisms all relate to the surveillance and reporting of disease through international or 
voluntary disease reporting systems. Whilst these disease surveillance and reporting systems 
are all helpful and provide information that is complementary to the Protocol, they are all 
necessarily voluntary in nature and cannot be mandatory.   It would be unrealistic  and 
could actually harm the health monitoring regime of the international community which 
depends critically upon participating States having confidence that, in reporting outbreaks of 
disease, they will not in some way be penalized  if a situation were to be sought in which 
reporting to the WHO, FAO and OIE were to be made mandatory in order to enable a body 
associated with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to use such data to try to 
determine whether some outbreak had been deliberate and thus in breach of the Convention.  
The Chairmans composite Protocol text requires the Technical Secretariat of the future 
Organization inter alia to collect, process and analyse relevant epidemiological information.  
Furthermore, the Technical Secretariat is also explicitly required to develop a framework for 
States Parties to support an international system for the global monitoring of emerging 
diseases in humans, animals and plants. It is not true, as has been alleged in testimony to the 
House subcommittee, to say that the Protocol does not have any provisions to create, expand 
or mandate systems to monitor disease occurrence. 
                                                 
26See United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and 
International Relations, 5 June 2001 and 10 July 2001 hearings.  Available at http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/ 
web_resources/news_briefing_june_5.htm and 
http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/web_resources/shays_pr_july_10 .htm 
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28.  Insofar as the development of other ideas and different approaches by the United States is 
concerned, it has to be recognized that the rejection of the Protocol by the United States after 
almost seven years of negotiation will poison the water and any new proposals, no matter 
how meritable, associated with the United States will be dead on arrival and will be rejected 
by the international community. There is simply no prospect of any early strengthening of the 
biological weapons multilateral prohibition regime by any means other than the Protocol in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
29.  The statement then alleges that there is no basis for a claim that the United States does 
not support multilateral instruments for dealing with weapons of mass destruction and 
missile threats and goes on to say that the US strongly support the Australia Group, and 
will be actively working to strengthen it.  However, the Australia Group27 is not a 
multilateral instrument -- it is merely an informal consultative gathering of like-minded States 
who have chosen to harmonise their export controls in respect of dual-use materials and 
technology related to chemical and biological weapons.  The support of the United States for 
true multilateral instruments for dealing with weapons of mass destruction is mixed -- the  
failure last year of the United States to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) despite leading the way in signing it in September 1996, the ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, which saw the administration accepting conditions which 
have the effect of eroding the Convention, and the rejection of the Protocol to the BTWC at 
the eleventh hour can in no way be seen as evidence of United States support for multilateral 
instruments. 
 
30.  The introduction ends by undertaking to outline some of the reasons for reaching the 
conclusion announced by the United States.  It is said that many of these will not be new or 
surprising.  They reflect positions that the United States has advanced repeatedly 
throughout the negotiations.  However, as noted above in paragraphs 13 and 14, the United 
States has only provided 16 of the over 450 working papers submitted to the Ad Hoc Group -- 
hardly a repeated advancement of US positions -- and has, on a number of occasions, 
endorsed the general approach to the Protocol, as noted, for example, in paragraphs 22 - 24 
above. 
 
B.  Objectives 
 
31.  This section starts by stating that one central objective of a Protocol is to uncover illicit 
activity.  However, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group agreed by the United States and the 
other States Parties at the Special Conference28 says nothing about uncovering illicit 
activity.   The mandate is aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the 
implementation of the Convention. 
 
32.   The section continues to refer to regular on-site inspections of locations potentially 
able to conduct such activity, the shorter notice and the more intrusive, the better.   It is, 
however, evident that during the Ad Hoc Group negotiations the United States has not been 
advocating or promoting such an approach. 
                                                 
27See information at http://www.australiagroup.net 
28United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva 19-30 September 1994, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 1994.  See Part II. Final 
Declaration, on pp.9-11. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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33.  It is then stated that "The provisions for on-site activity do not offer great promise of 
providing useful, accurate, or complete information to the international community." 
Whilst it is always possible to argue that the provisions for on-site activity could be 
improved, what the United States is failing to do is to compare the provisions in the Protocol 
with what is currently available under the Convention alone.  As was demonstrated in 
Evaluation Paper No 2129, such a comparison shows that the Protocol provides significant 
benefits. 
 
BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone 
Mandatory declarations 
  -- measures to ensure submission 
Confidence-Building Measures 
  -- patchy and variable (if made) 
Declaration follow-up procedures 
  -- analysis of declarations 
  -- randomly-selected transparency visits  
None 
  -- none 
  -- none 
Declaration clarification procedures 
  -- clarification visits 
None 
  -- none 
Voluntary assistance visits None 
Non-compliance concerns 
  -- Consultations >>> Investigations 
Art V consultation procedures 
Art VI complaint to UN Security Council 
Field investigation Possible UN Secretary-General investigation if 
invited by State Party concerned 
Facility investigation None 
 
34.  The statement goes on to say that when the US examined the prospects of the most 
intrusive and extensive on-site activities physically possible ... we discovered that the results 
of such intrusiveness would still not provide useful, accurate or complete information.  
This is hardly surprising as such a conclusion applies equally to the completeness of 
information under any on-site inspection under any arms control regime.  It is, however, a 
sweeping conclusion that is misleading in its assertion that such on-site activities would not 
provide useful information. It is evident from past experience that on-site activities have 
provided and do provide useful information -- concerns can either be resolved or reinforced.  
It is also misleading to suggest that on-site activities need to be considered in isolation.  They 
form a key element of an integrated regime comprising mandatory declarations, follow-up 
procedures and investigations which in the composite Protocol text provide a structured and 
elaborated framework for the provision of accurate information about the activities and 
facilities of the most relevance to the Convention.  This brings immense benefits as was noted 
by Dr John Gee, Deputy Director General of the OPCW, addressing the success of the 
declarations made under the CWC, who said30 that: 
 
What is significant is the fact that declarations have been made and the key parts of 
each State Party’s declarations are available to all other States Parties….This has 
been a considerable confidence-building measure….This process has answered a lot 
of questions that were out there prior to entry into force….all the other countries had 
to go on were press reports and intelligence estimates and so forth.  The whole 
                                                 
29Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
30John Gee, The CWC at the Two-Year Mark:  An Interview with Dr John Gee, Arms Control Today, April/May 
1999.  Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/aprmay99/jgam99.htm 
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process of having declarations available to other States Parties has been a great 
success and a very substantial confidence-building measure. 
 
If the situation with the Protocol in place is compared with the alternative of simply 
continuing with the Convention, it is impossible to see how a conclusion -- as has been stated 
recently in evidence to a Congressional subcommittee -- can be reached that a Protocol 
would not improve our ability to effectively verify compliance with the BWC either in terms of 
certifying that a country is in compliance with, or in violation of, its obligation”.  Without 
the Protocol all that any country has to go on are press reports, intelligence estimates and so 
on; intelligence estimates have necessarily to be worst case assumptions and may well give 
undue credence to rumour and innuendo or simply fail to recognise perfectly legal reasons for 
an activity. Indeed, an analysis31 of the history of biological weapons programmes up to 1945, 
has shown that misperceptions can lead to the initiation of offensive biological weapons 
programmes. However, with the Protocol in place, there will also be mandatory declarations 
from States Parties with the means to clarify any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or 
omissions, providing hard evidence as to activities and facilities within the State Party.   Any 
inconsistencies between parts of declarations can be addressed by States Parties as well as by 
the future Organization leading to a more comprehensive and soundly based appreciation of 
the activities and facilities within the State Party. 
 
35.  The statement goes on to state that "our assessment of the range of facilities potentially 
relevant to the Convention indicates that they number, at least in the case of the United 
States, in the thousands, if not the tens of thousands....Thus we had no hope that any 
attempt at a comprehensive declaration inventory would be accurate, timely or enduringly 
comprehensive."  It is widely recognised that the range of facilities potentially relevant to 
the Convention is very large.  The thrust of the Ad Hoc Group in its negotiation of the 
Protocol has been to focus on those facilities of greatest relevance to the Convention rather 
than on all facilities of potential relevance.  In doing so, the Ad Hoc Group has built upon the 
requirements agreed by the United States and other States Parties at the Review Conferences 
in 1986 and in 1991 for the provision of information in accordance with the Confidence 
Building Measures.  Working Papers by a number of other States Parties have shown that the 
numbers of most relevant facilities in European countries number in the tens rather than the 
hundreds.   In Briefing Paper No 2732 it was recalled that the architecture of the declaration 
requirements is designed to ensure that the most relevant facilities are declared and not all 
possible facilities.   It went on to note that a number of surveys of national microbiological 
activities have been reported to the AHG.  The results showing the numbers of facilities to be 
declared for Canada33, the Netherlands34, United Kingdom35, Italy36 and the five Nordic 
Countries37 can be summarised as follows: 
                                                 
31Erhard Geissler, John Ellis van Courtland Moon and Graham S. Pearson, Lessons from the History of 
Biological and Toxin Weapons, in Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (eds), Biological and 
Toxin Weapons:  Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies, No. 18, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 255 - 276. 
32Graham S. Pearson, The Emerging Protocol:  A Quantified Evaluation of the Regime, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 27, November 1999. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
33Canada, Discussion Paper on Declarations:  List of Agents and Combinations of Criteria,   BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP. 6, 28 November 1995. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
34The Netherlands, The Relevance and Effectiveness of (Combinations of) Criteria for Declaration,  BWC/AD 
HOC GROUP/WP.10, 28 November 1995.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
35United Kingdom, Survey of Microbiological Facilities in the UK,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 81, 23 July 
1996.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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 Canada Netherlands UK Italy 5 Nordic 
Countries 
Number of facilities to be 
declared 
30 to 50 [Tens] [Tens]* 40 50 
 
 * Based on recent discussions with the delegation. 
 
Briefing Paper No 27 also noted that in May 1998, the Austrian/UK contribution38 to the EU 
seminar for the pharmaceutical industry said that "the number of facilities in individual EU 
countries that would need to be declared can probably be measured in tens rather than 
hundreds."    It is clear that numbers in the 10s are being considered for most European 
countries and this has been confirmed in recent discussions with delegations.   Indeed, the Ad 
Hoc Group is to be congratulated in having crafted a declaration regime that is focussed on 
the most relevant facilities -- even though the United States has successfully argued for a 
reduction in the number of biological defence facilities and of production facilities subject to 
declaration and declaration follow-up procedures -- and these United States requests have 
been incorporated into the Chairman's composite Protocol text.  It is thus illogical for the 
United States to reject the Protocol on the grounds that the declaration inventory will not be 
comprehensive or accurate.   Once again, the United States has failed to compare what the 
Protocol would provide -- mandatory declarations backed up by transparency visits and 
clarification procedures -- with what the Convention alone can provide -- variable and patchy 
CBM responses individually interpreted by States Parties and no provision for  seeking 
clarification. 
 
36.  The statement goes on to say that the United States were forced to conclude that the 
mechanisms envisioned for the Protocol would not achieve their objectives, that no 
modification of them would allow them to achieve their objectives, and that trying to do 
more would simply raise the risk to legitimate United States activities.  This assertion is 
unsubstantiated by the facts -- the evaluation39 of the Protocol against the objectives set in the 
agreed mandate for the Ad Hoc Group negotiation of the Protocol shows that the objectives 
have indeed been met and adequate safeguards for legitimate activities have been 
incorporated.  Once again, the United States has failed to compare what the Protocol would 
provide with what is available from the Convention alone. 
 
37.  This section concludes by saying that the United States are forced to conclude that an 
appropriate balance cannot be struck that would make the draft Protocol defensible as an 
instrument whose utility outweighs its risk.  This conclusion is an assertion that is 
                                                                                                                                                       
36Italy, National Survey in the Microbiological Activities,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 146, 18 March 1997. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
37Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Results of a Facility Declaration Trial in the Five Nordic 
Countries,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 173, 18 July 1997.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
38Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations,  UK Presidency and the European Commission: 
The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998. 
39Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, The Emerging Protocol:  An Integrated Reliable and Effective 
Regime, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 25, September 1999. Graham 
S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Effective Strengthening 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
Evaluation Paper No 20, April 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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unsubstantiated.  It is, however, evident that if the Protocol is carefully evaluated40 first on an 
Article by Article basis of the costs and benefits of the Chairman's composite Protocol and 
then between the costs and benefits of signing the composite Protocol and rejecting the 
composite Protocol, the conclusion reached in Evaluation Paper No 21 is that signing the 
Protocol brings a net benefit to all States Parties and furthermore that: 
 
a.  In signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text, States Parties will be seen to 
have taken all possible practicable multilateral steps to obstruct the proliferation of 
biological weapons. 
 
b.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will reduce the risk of biological 
weapons proliferation and use.  Rejection of the Protocol would send the opposite 
signal and it can be argued that the risk of biological weapons proliferation and use 
will be increased. 
 
c.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will bring significant benefits to 
the infrastructure of States Parties in the areas of combatting infectious disease, 
biosafety and good manufacturing practice and thereby benefits in health, safety and 
prosperity for all States Parties, both developing and developed. 
 
d.  Overall, signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text enhances the security of 
all States Parties.  It provides a net gain to collective security.  Rejection of the 
Protocol misses this opportunity and decreases collective security.  
 
The United States in their rejection of the Protocol are overstating the risks and are 
frequently considering worst case improbable scenarios. 
 
C.  The Paradigm 
 
38.  This section starts by stating that another key objective for a Protocol ... would be to 
deter or complicate the ability of a rogue state to conduct an illicit offensive biological 
weapons program.   Once again, an objective is being asserted which does not appear in the 
mandate for the Ad Hoc Group agreed by the United States and the other States Parties at 
the Special Conference41.   Nevertheless, it is accepted that because the aim of the Protocol 
is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention, there 
is indeed an aim to deter non-compliance.  This was taken into account in the evaluation 
described in paragraphs 19 to 21 above which demonstrated that the Protocol measures do 
indeed contribute to deterrence of non-compliance. 
 
  
BTWC Protocol 
Regime Measure 
 
 
Deterrence of non-
compliance 
 Mandatory declarations Moderate 
                                                 
40Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
41United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva 19-30 September 1994, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 1994.  See Part II. Final 
Declaration, on pp.9-11.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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 Declaration follow-up 
procedures 
 
 - randomly-selected 
visits 
Good 
  
- declaration clarification 
procedures 
 
Good 
  
- voluntary visits 
 
Low 
  
Measures to ensure 
submission of 
declarations 
 
Good 
  
Investigations 
 
High 
  
Article VII Measures 
 
Moderate 
 
39.  The section goes on to note that the most frequently cited paradigm ... has been the 
Chemical Weapons Convention....This is unfortunately, seriously flawed.  This assertion 
ignores the reality of the situation that there is, and rightly so, a deliberate overlap between 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
that both conventions address toxins and all toxic substances produced by living organisms 
even when they are actually produced by synthesis.  The two Conventions therefore have a 
significant area of overlap, both have general purpose criteria which embrace all possible 
agents, past, present and future, and both address dual use materials and technology.   
 
Classical 
     CW
     Industrial 
Pharmaceutical 
     Chemicals
 Bioregulators 
     Peptides Toxins
Genetically 
   Modified 
       BW
Traditional 
      BW
Cyanide 
Phosgene 
Mustard 
Nerve Agents
Aerosols Substance P 
Neurokinin A
Saxitoxin 
Ricin 
Botulinum Toxin
Modified/ 
Tailored 
Bacteria 
Viruses
Bacteria 
Viruses 
Rickettsia 
 
Anthrax 
Plague 
Tularemia
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Chemical  Weapons  Convention
Poison Infect
 
 
It is now evident42 that chemistry and biology are coming closer together and that we are 
faced with a continuum -- after all biological agents are actually chemicals.  It is consequently 
                                                 
42See for example, Graham S. Pearson, New Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the 
Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No 3, 
July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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dangerous to suggest a separation between biological and chemical agents.   The CWC 
regime is thus the one of greatest relevance to the BTWC Protocol regime and it is incorrect 
to suggest that using the CWC as a paradigm for the BTWC Protocol is seriously flawed. 
 
40.  Indeed, as was noted in Evaluation Paper No 2143: 
 
It is hardly surprising that the BTWC Protocol regime has adopted some concepts 
where appropriate from the CWC regime.   It is not, however, just a simple copy 
which ignores the fundamental differences between the two areas.  The Protocol is, 
however, much more elaborated than the CWC and has been finely tailored to 
address the fundamental difference in the nature of biological agents as well as to 
capture the facilities of greatest relevance to the Convention.  If we ignore the 
chemical weapon and chemical weapon production facility elements44 of the CWC, 
then the basic architecture of the BTWC Protocol regime and the CWC regime is the 
same.  The qualitative differences between the regimes are in the detail: the BTWC 
Protocol regime has built on the confidence-building measures agreed by all the 
States Parties at the Second Review Conference in 1986 and extended at the Third 
Review Conference in 1991.   In respect of the monitoring of dual-purpose materials 
and facilities, the two regimes are very comparable, with the Protocol regime 
imposing a less onerous but more focussed burden in respect of declarations and 
visits whilst the international cooperation provisions are much more extensive than 
those of the CWC.  
 
41.  The section goes on to assert that in chemical [agent] manufacturing, ... such facilities, 
because of the toxicity and corrosiveness of the precursors, have recognizable 
infrastructure arguments.  This is a deeply flawed assertion which reflects a Western mind-
set in which agents were required to be stored for a retaliatory capability.  Alternative 
concepts, such as those adopted by Iraq, produce agent when required for use and utilize 
different synthesis routes.  In addition, the advent of the binary concept for chemical weapons 
in which less toxic precursors are mixed when required is ignored, as is the range of mid-
spectrum agents, such as bioregulators and toxins, which fall under both Conventions and do 
not involve toxic and corrosive precursors.  One of the key strengths of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention -- and of the BTWC -- is in their general purpose criteria which 
embrace all chemicals -- and biological agents -- that have no justification for permitted 
purposes. 
                                                 
43Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
44This difference results because the CWC was negotiated when a number of States had admitted to having 
stockpiles of chemical weapons and to having chemical weapon production facilities which are required to be 
destroyed under the CWC.  In contrast, when the BTWC was negotiated in the early 1970s the US had already 
announced that it would destroy its stockpile and no other State admitted to having stockpiles of biological 
weapons or to biological weapon production facilities.  Consequently, Article II of the Convention makes no 
mention of production facilities and simply states that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon 
as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, 
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its 
possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all 
necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. 
 
As the BTWC has been in force since 1975 and no State has admitted to a stockpile of biological weapons there 
are no provisions in the Protocol requiring the declaration and destruction under verification of such weapons. 
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42.   It is then stated that when setting up the CWC, we were able to require universal 
declaration for such facilities, and then establish an international regime that would visit 
each such facility on a regular and repeated basis.   When this statement is examined in 
detail, it does not stand up.  First of all, there is no universal declaration regime.   For 
example, facilities at which synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals is carried out in aggregate 
quantities less than 100 gram per year per facility are not subject to declaration or to 
verification.  Likewise, Schedule 2 facilities are not declared if they produce less than 1 kg of 
a chemical designated * in Schedule 2 A, less than 100 kg of other chemicals listed in 
Schedule 2 A or less than 1 tonne of a chemical listed in Schedule 2 B.  Similar arguments 
apply in respect of Schedule 3 facilities and the DOC (discrete organic facilities).  Moreover, 
it is well known that the CWC declaration regime relates solely to facilities that actually 
produce Scheduled chemicals -- identical facilities that could produce Scheduled chemicals 
but do not produce them are not declared or inspected.  It is not correct to claim that there is 
universal declaration for such facilities. 
 
43.  The section goes on to suggest that the Ad Hoc Group quickly recognized that no such 
cataloging was possible with respect to biology to biological facilities [sic].  Almost any 
facility that does biological work of any magnitude possesses the capability, under some 
parameters, of being diverted to biological weapons work.  Trying to catalog them all 
would be tantamount to impossible.  Likewise, visiting even those selected -- almost 
arbitrarily -- for declaration on the same universal and regular basis as the CWC would 
require an international organization of the size and possession of rare skills among its 
employees that no one in the Ad Hoc Group was willing to contemplate.  This is once again 
a misleading statement.  As already noted above, in paragraph 33, the Ad Hoc Group has 
rightly focussed the Protocol measures on the most relevant facilities rather than all possible 
facilities.    Insofar as the frequency of inspections under the BTWC Protocol and the CWC 
are concerned, this was examined in Briefing Paper No 2745 in November 1999.  This 
provided the following information on the CWC inspection requirements46 together with the 
numbers of inspectable facilities: 
 
Facility Type Estimated  
declarable 
number 
(1998 
Budget47) 
Declared 
inspectable 
number 
(1998 
Report48) 
Assumed 
inspectable 
number 
(2000 
Budget49) 
Inspection 
duration 
Number  
inspected 
per year 
per plant 
site 
Number 
inspected  
per year  
per State Party 
Schedule 1 
chemicals 
40 24 35 As required Not limited Not limited 
                                                 
45Graham S. Pearson, The Emerging Protocol:  A Quantified Evaluation of the Regime, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 27, November 1999. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
46United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification 
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the 
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.org/cwc/cwc-eng.htm 
47Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and 
Budget 1998,  Second Session, 1 - 5 December 1997, C-II/6, 6 December 1997. 
48Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annual Report 1998. 
49Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and 
Budget 2000,  Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-II/DEC.23, 2 July 1999. 
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Schedule 2 
chemicals 
400 119 178 96 hours* 2 Not limited 
Schedule 3 
chemicals 
500 329 429 24 hours* 2 3 + 5% sites≤ 20 
DOCs/PSFs 6 - 15,000 3,314 5,500 24 hours* 2 3 + 5% sites≤ 20 
 
* As specified in the Convention.  Extensions may be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected 
State Party. 
 
The number of inspections per year per State Party for plant sites producing Schedule 3 
chemicals or DOCs is a combined limit.  The Convention states in respect of Schedule 3 plant 
sites that "the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the 
total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part VIII of 
this Annex [the part relating to DOCs], or 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is 
the lower."   Consequently, for a State Party with a combined total of Schedule 3 and DOCs 
plant sites of 20, the limit would be a total of  3 + 5% of 20 = 4 inspections.   If it had a 
combined total of 100 such plant sites, the limit would be 3 + 5% of 100 = 8 inspections.  It is 
noted that the combined ceiling of 20 visits for Schedule 3 and DOCs plant sites will only 
come into effect when the State Party has in excess of 340 Schedule 3 and DOC plant sites. 
 
44.  Briefing Paper No 27 also noted that the numbers of inspections under Article VI 
Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention planned50 by the OPCW for 1999 and 2000 
are as follows: 
 
Facility/Plant Site Expected number 
of inspections  
in 1999 
Anticipated 
inspectable sites 
as of 31 Dec 1999 
Planned number 
of inspections  
for 2000 
Intensity* 
(%) 
in 2000 
Schedule 1     
SSSF 7 7 7 100 
Other 10 28 18 64 
Total Schedule 1 17 35 25 70 
Schedule 2     
Initial 49 57 57 100 
Routine 3 121 10 8 
Total Schedule 2 52 178 67 38 
Schedule 3 7 429 34 8 
DOC/PSF 0  5500 6 0.1 
Overall Total 76 -- 132 -- 
 
 Notes 
 
* Intensity is calculated by dividing the number of inspections by the number of 
inspectable sites and multiplying by 100. 
 
The Convention specifies that inspections of DOC/PSF plant sites shall start at the 
beginning of the fourth year after entry into force -- they therefore started in May 
2000. 
 
                                                 
50Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and 
Budget 2000,  Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-II/DEC.23, 2 July 1999. 
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The intensity of randomly-selected transparency visits under the Protocol regime -- assuming 
the same number of facilities declared globally of 2,500 as in Briefing Paper No 27 -- would 
be 3.6, corresponding to about half of the intensity of 8% planned for Schedule 3 facilities 
under the CWC but significantly better than the intensity of 0.1% planned for discrete organic 
chemical (DOC) facilities. 
 
45.  Insofar as the size of the Organization to implement the Protocol is concerned, the United 
States has been keen to see the size and budget kept small because of the sizeable 
contribution that would be made by the United States towards that budget.  Indeed, there was 
language in earlier versions of the rolling text that limited the contribution of any one State 
Party to the cost of the future Organization to 25%. 
 
46.   The statement goes on to say that what we are left with, then, is a regime that 
contemplates -- at best -- declaration of an almost random-selected set of facilities from 
among those actually relevant to a potential proliferator.  This is simply untrue -- the 
facilities to be declared under the Protocol are those that are most relevant to the Convention.  
They build upon and go beyond the facilities that are the subject of the Confidence Building 
Measures agreed at the Second Review Conference and extended at the Third Review 
Conference.  It is noteworthy that Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the leader of the United States 
delegation to the Second Review Conference in 1986 in his final remarks said51 that: 
 
 "Recognizing the norm established by the Convention, the United States had joined in 
recommending several measures intended to strengthen that norm, particularly within 
the context of Article V.  He trusted that those measures would be fully implemented 
by all parties to the Convention and would thus lead to greater international 
transparency and openness with regard to the Convention."   
 
It is also evident from the record of the Second Review Conference that the United States 
cosponsored52 language relating to the Confidence-Building Measure on activities relating to 
protection against biological and toxin weapons.  Likewise at the Third Review Conference, 
Michael Moodie providing final remarks on behalf of the United States said53 that: 
 
In his Government's view, the key to the success of the Convention was confidence.  
The Conference had agreed on a package of confidence-building measures that would 
significantly increase the transparency and openness of biological activities related 
to the Convention; those efforts represented a remarkable step forward and their test 
would be whether all States parties lived up to their commitment to participate 
actively in them.  [Emphasis added] 
 
                                                 
51United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, 8 - 26 September 1986, Final Document, Geneva 1986, BWC/CONF.II/9. See BWC/CONF.II/ 
SR.10, pp. 4-5.  
52United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, 8 - 26 September 1986, Final Document, Geneva 1986, BWC/CONF.II/9, pp. 19-20. 
53United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, 9 - 27 September 1991, Final Document, Geneva 1992, BWC/CONF.III/23, p 214. 
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The US statement of 25 July 2001 is thus inconsistent with the approach taken by the United 
States at the Second and Third Review Conferences where there was no suggestion that the 
Confidence-Building measures were addressing a randomly-selected set of facilities. 
 
47.  The statement goes on to state that "the overwhelming bulk of such activity would take 
place on the territory of those States Parties least likely to be proliferation candidates." 
This remark indicates a misconception of global dynamics.  There is no prospect in the 
multilateral world of the 21st century for a regime which is not equable across all States 
Parties, both developing and developed.   The Protocol is being negotiated by the States 
Parties to the BTWC and it is illogical to contemplate the establishment of a regime which is 
focussed on those States which are perceived to be proliferation candidates.   This 
demonstrates once again the failure of the United States to recognise that the whole thrust of 
the Protocol is to build confidence between States Parties who are all committed to 
strengthening the norm against biological weapons.  It is needlessly divisive to suggest that 
the States Parties can be allocated into two categories -- those who are proliferation 
candidates and those who are not. 
 
48.  The statement goes on to assert that the required emphasis on the wrong targets from 
among the susceptible population simply does not provide anything remotely resembling a 
deterrent function on a proliferator, even a non-state actor.   This continues to reflect a 
misunderstanding of the aim of the Protocol -- to increase transparency and thereby build 
confidence between States Parties.   The entry into force of the composite Protocol text and 
its implementation by States Parties will over time strengthen the effectiveness of the 
Convention thereby bringing benefits to the collective security of all the States Parties.  A 
state contemplating proliferation would be unlikely to become a State Party to the Protocol as 
that state could not be certain that its prohibited activities would not be exposed through the 
implementation of the Protocol.  In any event, a State Party to the Protocol has increased the 
costs should it subsequently decide to violate the Convention. 
 
49.  The suggestion that the Protocol will not deter a non-state actor is misleading.  As the 
United States well knows, the Convention and the Protocol are between States Parties.  What 
is important in respect of non-State actors are the provisions in the Convention and especially 
in the Protocol for each State Party to take national measures, including penal legislation, to 
implement the treaties.  Furthermore, the emphasis in the Protocol to improving infrastructure 
-- and thus controls on national and international transfers of dual-purpose biological agents 
and equipment -- directly contribute to safety and security within States Parties by making it 
more difficult for non-State actors to obtain biological agents.  Indeed, this is one area where 
the United States has shown leadership with its select agent programme54 requiring 
registration of facilities using such agents and control of transfers of such agents.  However, 
the United States appears not to have recognized that, through the composite Protocol, other 
States Parties can be helped to introduce comparable national controls bringing benefits to all 
States Parties as any use by non-State actors is unlikely to be confined in its impact to a single 
state. 
 
                                                 
54United States, Federal Register, Department of Health and Human Services, Additional Requirements for 
Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents,  Rules and Regulations, Volume 61, No. 207, Thursday 24 
October 1996, 55190 - 55200.  The US select agent programme and its requirements are addressed in Graham S. 
Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing 
Paper No 7, March 1998. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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50.   The statement goes on to state that we therefore conclude that the conceptual approach 
used in the current negotiating effort fails to address the objective we have sought 
throughout the negotiations.  It is clear from the previous statements of the United States -- 
notably in 1994 at the Special Conference, in 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference and in 
1998 in Working Paper No 296 addressed in paragraphs 22 to 24 above -- that the United 
States in its statement of 25 July 2001 is arguing the direct opposite of what it had previously 
argued. 
 
51.  The statement then argues that if we are to find an appropriate solution, we need to 
think "outside the box".  It will require new and innovative paradigms to deal with the 
magnitude of biological activity that can be a threat, the explosively changing technology 
in the biological fields, and the varied potential objectives of a biological weapons 
program.  This statement is contrary to the appreciation that the developments in 
biotechnology are actually an argument for a Protocol sooner rather than later.  As the 
editorial55 addressing the CWC and BWC: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow pointed out in The 
CBW Conventions Bulletin in December 2000 "Considering that biological weapons and the 
potential of future biotechnology for hostile misuse pose a danger to humanity..., the need to 
develop a positive and cooperative verification culture worldwide is particularly great."  
However, in addition, this assertion ignores the fact that in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations of 
the Protocol, considerable effort has been put into the measures to achieve full and effective 
implementation of Article X of the Convention.  These measures are elaborated in Article 14 
Scientific and Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Co-operation of 
the Chairman's composite Protocol text.  Analyses56 of these provisions have shown that 
these measures make a significant contribution to both increasing transparency and to 
building confidence as well as to providing information that can help to resolve 
inconsistencies, ambiguities and anomalies as shown in the following schematic taken from 
Briefing Paper No 2557: 
                                                 
55The CWC and the BWC: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 50, December 
2000, pp. 1 - 2. 
56See, for example, Graham S. Pearson, Article VII Measures: Optimizing the Benefits, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 22, July 1999 and Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Specific 
Measures to Achieve Implementation, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 
9, July 1998. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
57Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, The Emerging Protocol:  An Integrated Reliable and Effective 
Regime, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 25, September 1999. 
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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It is evident that the Ad Hoc Group has indeed been thinking "outside the box" -- and, more 
to the point, has actually crafted innovative measures in the Chairman's composite Protocol 
text that do deal constructively with enhancing safety and security of biological activities.  
Interestingly, this analogy of the box was used in the analysis58 of a Workshop held in May 
2000 which demonstrated the effectiveness of measures in the Protocol to implement Article 
X of the Convention provides over time increased transparency and builds confidence. 
 
52.  Finally, the statement in this section concludes that we simply cannot try to patch or 
modify the models we have used elsewhere.  As already noted earlier in paragraphs 37 & 38, 
this conclusion ignores the reality of the overlap of the scope of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which rightly both cover 
toxins and all toxic substances produced by living organisms even when they are actually 
produced by synthesis.  The composite Protocol has successfully built upon and utilized 
concepts from a wide range of previous models -- indeed, the United States position appears 
to be encapsulated by the words we simply cannot try. 
 
D.  Biodefense Issues 
 
53.  The statement says "As we have stated repeatedly, any Protocol needed to ensure that 
the ability to protect against those who would violate the norm of abolishing biological 
weapons was not impaired."  This is a case where the United States appears to fear a non-
existent danger -- the composite Protocol text in Article 13, paragraph 2, states that: 
                                                 
58Graham S. Pearson, Maximizing the Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and 
Biotechnology, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 29, July 2000. 
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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2.  Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State 
Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of 
protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, for purposes not 
prohibited under the Convention. 
 
This language is identical to that in Article X, paragraph 2 of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention which states that:  
 
2.  Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State 
Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of 
protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under the 
Convention. 
 
The concerns expressed in the statement are thus ill-founded. 
 
54.  The statement then goes on to recognize that finding a balance of protection and 
disclosure has been especially difficult in the biodefense arena.   Although it is noted that 
the composite Protocol text includes a number of elements the United States has demanded, it 
goes on to state that there are still several provisions in the current proposals we believe 
would be inimical to legitimate national security efforts.  It is difficult to understand what is 
causing this concern to the United States as no details are provided here of what provisions in 
the Protocol are so inimical.  What is evident, however, is that the provisions in the Protocol 
have been negotiated by all the States Parties active in the Ad Hoc Group and all those with 
active biological defence programmes have taken a keen interest in the provisions in the 
Protocol but without expressing the view that these are inimical to their legitimate security 
interests.  There is no requirement for the declarations of biological defence activities or 
facilities to disclose any vulnerabilities or for any national security information to be 
provided.  When one considers that the United States is already far more open about its 
biological defence programme59 than any other country in the world, one has to wonder what 
the basis is for the US assertions in the US statement of 25 July 2001. 
 
55.   The statement then goes on to argue that the area of biodefense is subject to the same 
inherent flaw described earlier.  It is asserted that the exclusions in declarations would 
permit a potential proliferator to conceal significant efforts in legitimately undeclared 
facilities.  Conversely, if we try to make the declarations comprehensive enough to capture 
all biodefense activity, the level of risk to legitimate and sensitive national security 
information becomes truly unbearable.  The argument here is interesting in that the United 
States acknowledges that it has the most extensive biodefense program described by any 
participant in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations, yet whilst the other States Parties are content 
with the provisions in the Protocol requiring the declaration of national biological defence 
programmes and facilities, it is the United States which has expressed concern and has argued 
for the adoption of a more complex declaration regime in which only the larger biodefense 
facilities are declared with smaller ones only being listed with minimal declaration 
requirements and no follow-up through declaration follow-up procedures.  Consequently, the 
problems which the United States identifies in the provisions for biodefense are ones created 
by the United States.    
 
                                                 
59See for example, US Department of Defense Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Defense: Annual Report to 
Congress available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chembio02012000.pdf 
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56.  As noted earlier, in paragraph 35, it is widely recognised that the range of facilities 
potentially relevant to the Convention can be very large.  The thrust of the Ad Hoc Group in 
its negotiation of the Protocol has been to focus on those facilities of greatest relevance to 
the Convention rather than on all facilities of potential relevance.  This same approach has 
been followed in respect of biodefence programmes and activities.  In doing so, the Ad Hoc 
Group has built upon the requirements agreed by the United States and other States Parties at 
the Review Conferences in 1986 and in 1991 for the provision of information in accordance 
with the Confidence Building Measures.  Indeed, the Ad Hoc Group is to be congratulated in 
having crafted a declaration regime that is focussed on the most relevant facilities -- even 
though the United States has successfully argued for a reduction in the number of biological 
defence facilities and of production facilities subject to declaration and declaration follow-up 
procedures -- and these United States requests have been incorporated into the Chairman's 
composite Protocol text.  It is thus illogical for the United States to reject the Protocol on the 
grounds that the declaration inventory will not be comprehensive or accurate.   Yet again, the 
United States has failed to compare what the Protocol would provide -- mandatory 
declarations backed up by transparency visits and clarification procedures -- with what the 
Convention alone can provide -- variable and patchy CBM responses individually interpreted 
by States Parties and no provision for  seeking clarification. 
 
E.  On-Site Activity Utility 
 
57.   The statement refers to the dysfunction of concentrating on-site activity in places that 
would largely be irrelevant to possible biological weapons concerns.  This alone detracts 
seriously from any value for the objectives of the Ad Hoc Group.  This reiterates a serious 
misperception of the aim of the Protocol, as already noted above in paragraphs 47 and 48, 
which recognized that there is no prospect in the multilateral world of the 21st century for a 
regime which is not equable across all States Parties, both developing and developed.   The 
Protocol is being negotiated by the States Parties to the BTWC and it is illogical to 
contemplate the establishment of a regime which is focussed on those States which are 
perceived to be possible biological weapons concerns.   This demonstrates once again the 
failure of the United States to recognise that the whole thrust of the Protocol is to build 
confidence between States Parties who are all committed to strengthening the norm against 
biological weapons.  It is needlessly divisive to suggest that the States Parties can be allocated 
into two categories -- those who are possible biological weapons concerns and those who are 
not.  It is worth recalling in this context that under the Chemical Weapons Convention less 
than 40 per cent of the States Parties are directly affected by the routine compliance 
verification activities60 -- presumably the same dysfunction referred to in the US statement of 
25 July 2001 applies equally to the CWC.  
 
58.  The statement goes on to say that the activities outlined to take place on a regular basis, 
transparency visits, actually risk damage to innocent declared facilities.  The same 
argument was advanced prior to the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
regard to the routine inspections of Scheduled chemical facilities.  This has been shown to be 
not the case.  As noted previously, the purpose of transparency visits is to increase 
transparency and build confidence -- their aim is to promote the consistency of declarations 
and not to catch out States Parties. 
 
                                                 
60Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annual Report 2000.  Available at http://www. 
opcw.org/cvi/Annual_Report_Index.htm 
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59.  It then adds that such transparency visits would almost have no chance of discovering 
anything useful to the BWC if they took place at a less-than-innocent facility.  This ignores 
the fact that if a State Party chose to carry out prohibited activities at a declared facility, the 
State Party would never be completely certain that during a transparency visit -- or through a 
declaration clarification procedure -- these prohibited activities would not be exposed or that 
suspicions would be raised because of inconsistencies observed by the visiting team or the 
future Organization in its analysis of the information available to it.  There is, as already 
noted, a significant deterrent element in the composite Protocol regime that contributes to the 
overall benefits from the regime. 
 
60.  The statement then goes on to assert that through transparency visits proprietary or 
national security information may be at risk, and/or the activity may serve to misdirect 
world attention into non-productive channels.  This assertion ignores the fact that a number 
of States Parties have carried out practice transparency visits61 and shown that such 
transparency visits as formulated in the composite Protocol text present minimal risk to 
either proprietary or national security information.  Several of these practice transparency 
visits have been carried out in the presence of observers from other States Parties. 
 
WP No. Date State Party Type of facility 
76 18 Jul 96 UK/Brazil Vaccine and serum production facility 
77 18 Jul 96 Australia Biological production facility 
251 17 Dec 97 UK Industrial facility 
258 9 Jan 98 UK Pharmaceutical research facility 
298 21 Aug 98 Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden 
Biopharmaceutical production facility 
310 23 Sep 98 Austria Pharmaceutical facility 
345 14 Jan 99 Iran Vaccine and serum production facility 
371 10 Jun 99 Switzerland Industrial production facility 
398 24 Aug 99 Germany Industrial production facility 
414 17 Mar 00 Spain  Biodefence facility 
437 13 Dec 00 Australia Biodefence facility 
 
The statement also is at variance with testimony62 provided by Ambassador Don Mahley in 
September 2000 to a Congressional subcommittee in which he testified that: 
 
The Chemical Weapons Convention inspections already conducted on both 
Department of Defense facilities and at commercial firms have thus far 
demonstrated our ability to fulfill the obligations of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention without sacrificing sensitive national security or commercial proprietary 
information.  We are using the lessons and experience learned to explore ways to 
                                                 
61A useful summary of these practice visits is provided in Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Testimony before the 
SubCommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Hearing on the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol: Status and Implications, 5 June 
2001.  available at http://www.house.gov/reform.ns/107th_testimony/testimony_of_barabara_hatch_rosen.htm 
62Donald A. Mahley, Testimony before the House Government Reform Committee SubCommittee on National 
Security, Veteran Affairs and International Relations,  The Biological Weapons Convention Protocol: Status and 
Implications, 13 September 2000.  Available at http://www.house.gov/reform.ns/floor/testimony_of_ 
ambassador_donald_a.htm 
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achieve an equal level of protection in biological activities and we are confident we 
can do so by the time any BWC Protocol is in place. [Emphasis added] 
 
Given that the composite Protocol provisions for transparency visits are far less intrusive 
than those of the Chemical Weapons Convention for routine inspections, the basis for the 
remarks in the United States statement of 25 July 2001 is not at all apparent. 
 
61.  The assertion that world attention may be misdirected into non-productive channels is 
without foundation.  There is no evidence from the implementation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention that, despite similar expressions of alarm in the United States prior to 
entry into force, of any such misdirection of world attention.   The provisions in the 
composite Protocol text to prevent abuse of the provisions are at least as strong as those in 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and it is hard to see what conditions would result in such 
misdirection of world attention.  Certainly, the recent United States statement of 25 July 
2001 can be argued as misdirecting world attention away from the vital importance of 
seizing the opportunity now to significantly strengthen the BTWC regime through the 
adoption of the Protocol -- and thereby help prevent the danger of proliferation of biological 
weapons. 
 
62.  The statement goes on to say that although a number of safeguards have been inserted 
into procedures to protect information not relevant to the BWC, those safeguards are 
insufficient to eliminate unacceptable risks to proprietary or national security 
information.  The basis for this assertion is not evident given the fact the composite 
Protocol text already contains more provisions to safeguard commercial and national 
security information than did the Chemical Weapons Convention when it emerged from the 
negotiations in Geneva.   It is also at variance with the points made in the previous 
paragraph and is also contradictory to the fact that when the spectrum of chemical and 
biological agents is concerned in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention then 
facilities producing toxins, bioregulators and other mid-spectrum agents are already subject 
to the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention apparently without creating such 
unacceptable risks. 
 
63.  The United States have repeatedly expressed great concern about the potential loss of 
commercial proprietary information through randomly selected visits to declared industrial 
facilities.  As was noted in Evaluation Paper No 2163, given that the maximum number of 
randomly-selected transparency visits that any State Party can receive in a year is 7, this 
means that for the maximum number of such visits in any year to a State Party with a large 
number of declared facilities is only 7 in total to all the facilities declared by that State Party -
- whether biological defence, maximum containment (BL-4), high containment, plant 
pathogen containment, work with listed agents and toxins or production.   The burden on the 
industry nationally in a country with a large number of declared facilities is unlikely to be 
more than perhaps four visits per year -- lasting no longer than 2 days each and with no more 
than four members in a visiting team.   This burden pales into insignificance when compared 
to other national and international regulatory body inspections of such industrial facilities.   In 
the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) makes some 22,000 inspections 
                                                 
63Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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each year of about a third of the US firms inspectable by the FDA64.  A further handful of 
visits -- totalling 7 at the most -- is hardly a significant additional burden to an already highly 
regulated industry.   These visits are, however, sufficient to meet the transparency objectives 
set for them in the Protocol. 
 
64.  The statement continues by asserting that our concern, however, is not for the United 
States alone.  We simply cannot agree to make ourselves and other countries subject to 
such risks when we can find no corresponding benefit in impeding proliferation efforts 
around the globe.  This assertion ignores the fact that the European Union and the other 
States Parties engaged in negotiating the Protocol have examined the risks and have 
concluded that the provisions in the Chairman's composite Protocol text provide adequate 
safeguards and that the benefits arising from the Protocol far outweigh the risks.  The United 
States needs to reexamine its assessments. 
 
F.  Constitutional and Ratification Issues 
 
65.   In this section the statement notes that the United States has made the Ad Hoc Group 
aware of the constraints we [the United States] face in achieving ratification of an 
international agreement.  This is a curious argument as it is known that there has been a 
reluctance of the executive branch to engage the legislative branch at an early stage during the 
past seven years of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations -- a reluctance that may well stem from 
the tension that was apparent when the Chemical Weapons Convention was submitted to the 
Senate for advice and consent to ratification and resulted in the executive branch undertaking 
to meet 28 conditions in regard to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
In Evaluation Paper No 665, we pointed out that whatever may or may not be the international 
legal standing of such conditions, they constitute a political fact; and they demonstrate that 
devices other than reservations may be employed openly to reinterpret obligations, thereby 
weakening the treaty regime, in ways that other States Parties may find disconcerting but 
can do nothing to remedy.  For this reason, we recommended that Article XXI of the rolling 
text should provide a comprehensive overall ban on reservations as follows: 
  
ARTICLE XXI 
 
RESERVATIONS 
 
The Articles of and the Annexes and Appendices of this Protocol shall not be subject 
to reservations.  In addition, no exceptions or conditions, however phrased or 
named, including interpretative statements or declarations, which purport to 
exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Articles and the Annexes 
and Appendices of this Protocol in their application to any State, may be made by 
any State upon signing, ratifying or acceding to this Protocol. 
 
The reluctance to engage the legislative branch during the negotiation of the Protocol is in 
marked contrast to other States Parties where the opportunity has been taken to make 
appropriate parliamentary bodies aware of the ongoing negotiations of the Protocol and of the 
likely benefits that will accrue in countering the proliferation of biological weapons from 
                                                 
64Food and Drug Administration, Food and Drug Administration FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request.  
Available at http://www.fda.gov 
65Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXI: Reservations, University of Bradford, Department of 
Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper No 6, September 1999. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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such a Protocol.  For example, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons 
in its report66 of 25 July 2000 concluded that: 
 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is an integral part of the web 
of deterrence against states developing and stockpiling WMD.  To be effective it 
should have an equally stringent verification regime to that of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  We endorse the Government's view that an effective BTWC Protocol 
requires a package of complimentary measures -- declarations, visits and 
investigations.  Whilst recognising the need to take account of legitimate concerns 
about protecting commercial proprietary information, we believe that national 
security requirements demand that the BTWC contains the strongest verification 
regime that can be agreed.  The Government has played a positive role in arguing for 
such a regime.  We recommend that the Government reiterate this position and push 
for an early conclusion to the negotiations. 
 
It is interesting to note that the same report also made a recommendation: 
 
We recommend that the Government use the UK's position as close ally of the USA to 
convince it that a strong verification procedure for biological and toxin weapons 
which does not affect commercial confidentiality is a viable and achievable role. 
 
It is disappointing to find that the executive branch in the United States is not maintaining a 
sustained campaign to inform the legislative branch of the developments in the multilateral 
community and is thereby taking steps to ensure that when a Protocol is submitted for advice 
and consent that the Senate is then in an informed situation that can judge the Protocol on its 
merits.  Indeed, recent testimonies67 to a House Subcommittee by State Department officials 
have been less than helpful as they have foreshadowed the US statement of 25 July 2001 
rejecting the Protocol.   
 
66.  This section goes on to say that we have explicitly recognized that some of the 
conditions necessary to satisfy these requirements would theoretically allow abuse.  For 
our own part, the United States does not use such devices in an abusive fashion.  It is 
indeed a sad day when a co-Depositary of a Convention feels it necessary to explain that for 
ratification of a legally binding instrument, it will have to agree to conditions that could be 
abused -- and not to recognize that such conditions weaken the regime to no one's 
advantage. 
 
 
 
 
G.  Export Controls 
 
                                                 
66House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Weapons of Mass Destruction,  Eighth Report, 25 July 2000, 
page xiii, paragraph 18.  Available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/fac 
67See, for example, Dr O. J. Sheaks, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Testimony 
before the SubCommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs and International Relations, Committee on 
Government Reform, US House of Representatives, 5 June 2001 and Dr. Edward Lacey, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Testimony before the SubCommittee on National 
Security, Veteran Affairs and International Relations,  Committee on Government Reform, US House of 
Representatives, 10 July 2001. Available at http://www.house.gov/reform.ns/107th_testimony/testimony_of_dr 
lacey.htm 
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67.  This section commences by saying that some of the participants in these negotiations 
have viewed the issue as much from the perspective of technological development as from 
direct security enhancement measures.  Whilst the United States agrees with the concept 
that global technological development in biotechnology helps create a more secure 
environment, we view this as a subordinate element to the compliance-enhancements of 
any Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.   Whilst this may well be the view of 
the United States, it has to be recognised that for many States, the benefits of the Protocol lie 
in the technical cooperation and development areas.   It is also interesting to note that the 
first two working papers submitted by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group dealt with 
BTWC Article X issues (AHG/23, WP. 25) and the third addressed the role of epidemiology 
(WP. 73).   It was only the fourth working paper by the United States in July 1997 that could 
be considered to have addressed security enhancement in proposing language for the 
Preamble to the Protocol (WP. 176).  The importance of technical cooperation and 
development has been recognized by most of the delegations who see the two pillars of 
security and development as being complementary and which together provide the 
incentives necessary to achieve universality.  Indeed, as already mentioned above, the 
measures in Article 14 directly contribute over time to improved health, safety, security and 
prosperity for all States Parties, large or small., developed or developing. 
 
68.  The statement then continues to somewhat obliquely address export controls by first 
referring to a statement by another delegation suggesting the dissolving of any parallel 
export control regimes after the Protocol enters into force and goes on to say We also take 
seriously the threat of biological weapons proliferation.  A Protocol should be, if it were 
properly focussed and implemented, another instrument in the set of tools countering 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Never has the argument been made 
successfully that it would have become the single answer to the proliferation problem.  To 
insist that other effective tools be forfeited in order to establish a Protocol is an indication 
of the wide gap between demands and possible solutions still existing in these 
negotiations.  This assertion is not about what is in the Chairman's composite Protocol text -
- but about what another delegation has said in a statement.  This is no basis for a statement 
rejecting the composite Protocol.  After all, it has to be recognized that what the composite 
Protocol text actually states in Article 7 is that:  
 
Each State Party shall ... review and, if necessary, amend or establish any 
legislation, regulatory or administrative provisions to regulate the transfer of 
agents, toxins, equipment and technologies relevant to Article III of the 
Convention...[Emphasis added] 
 
Consequently, the Protocol requirement is to establish legislation, regulatory or 
administrative proposals to regulate the transfer of agents, toxins, equipment and 
technologies -- a far cry from the assertion that an effective tool has to be forfeited.  The 
United States appears not to recognize that there are many other States Parties to the BTWC 
who have seriously addressed their implementation of Article III of the Convention -- and 
who see the composite Protocol text as being in their national interests.   This appears to be 
another instance where the United States is making assertions about a non-existent situation. 
 
69.  This section also includes language which says that the Ad Hoc Group product, or the 
international organization -- affectionately known as the OPBW -- envisioned by the 
current draft Protocol, is an appropriate substitute for those other organizations.  In fact, 
we fear that the inevitable competition of alternative international organizations with 
overlapping mandates could actually impede the effectiveness of those other already 
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existing organizations.  The basis for this assertion is far from clear as it is very clear from 
Article 1 General Provisions of the composite Protocol that: 
 
In implementing the provisions of this Protocol, the States Parties and the 
Director-General shall, when appropriate, take into account existing agreements 
and competencies of other relevant international organizations and agencies as 
well as the activities of the States Parties in order to avoid duplication and to 
ensure an effective and co-ordinated use of resources.  
 
The experience from the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention has shown 
that the States Parties through the Executive Council and the Conference of States Parties 
exercise a high degree of control of the programme and the resources allocated to the various 
elements of it.  Once again, it appears that the United States is making an assertion about a 
non-existent situation. 
 
70.  The statement then goes on to say that global political situations would indicate that 
the very countries trying hard to argue for compensation to agree to security 
enhancement are those most likely to have a biological weapons threat to their own 
security. This assertion is at variance with the remarks frequently made about the 
vulnerability of the United States to biological weapons such as the remarks made68 by 
President Bush in June 2001 that "Our United States and our allies ought to develop the 
capacity to address the true threats of the 21st century.  The true threats are biological and 
information warfare."  In any event, a difference in view between the United States and 
other States Parties on the relative importance assigned to security measures and to technical 
development measures in the Protocol is no basis for rejection of the Protocol.  It has to be 
recognized that the Protocol is an integrated package of measures that together will 
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention -- and that 
different States Parties will see different elements of that package as being of particular 
value to their nations.  Overall, the goal is to achieve universal adherence to the Protocol and 
to the Convention. 
 
71.  The statement goes on to say that the United States believes very strongly in employing 
all available means to enhance international security.  One of the things we will not allow 
is any degradation of those tools we already have to fight a serious challenge to security.  
As already pointed out in paragraph 65 above, there is nothing in the composite Protocol 
that degrades any of the tools that are already available to fight this serious challenge to 
security.  Rather the United States through its rejection of the Protocol has degraded one of 
the key tools available to fight the threat of biological weapons -- the multilateral prohibition 
regime of the BTWC which is the currently the weakest of all the regimes prohibiting or 
controlling weapons of mass destruction.  The composite Protocol  provides a valuable and 
effective strengthening of the BTWC regime which would significantly counter the threat of 
biological weapons. 
 
72.  This section concludes by saying that it is the responsibility of us all ... to inhibit or 
prevent biological weapons being in the hands of any state or party whatsoever, by both 
national and international means....Efforts to constrain, impede or eliminate such efforts 
will be unacceptable to the United States now and at any time in the foreseeable future.  
Those who think there is any flexibility on this point in the United States are sadly 
                                                 
68The White House, Remarks by the President in Tax Celebration Event, Barrett Farm, Dallas Center, Iowa, 8 
June 2001.  Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010608-2.html 
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mistaken, and should abandon any such pursuits.  This vehement statement appears to be 
quite unwarranted as, has already been pointed out, there is nothing in the composite 
Protocol that constrains, impedes or eliminates the efforts of the United States to implement 
Article III of the BTWC -- rather the opposite in that the Protocol requirement is for States 
Parties to establish legislation, regulatory or administrative proposals to regulate the transfer 
of agents, toxins, equipment and technologies. 
 
H.  Disturbing Negotiating Positions. 
 
73.  The relevance of the negotiating positions of other States Parties to the rejection of the 
composite Protocol by the United States is not evident.   The statement says that the 
mandate of the Ad Hoc Group clearly states that any Protocol must not abridge, diminish 
or otherwise weaken the Biological Weapons Convention.  .... We must wonder, though, 
when we are asked to consider provisions that would constrict the potential scope of the 
prohibitions in the Convention by fixing the meaning of terms in the Convention itself.   
The United States have not been alone in insisting that the provisions in the Protocol do not 
amend the prohibitions in the Convention and that view has been incorporated into the 
composite Protocol text.   As there are no definitions in the composite Protocol text that fix 
the meaning of terms in the Convention itself, the United States is once again expressing 
concern about negotiating positions -- not about what is actually in the composite Protocol.   
Whilst the United States is undoubtedly correct in emphasising the fact that the Protocol 
does not amend the basic prohibitions and obligations in the Convention, this emphasis is 
simply not relevant to the rejection of the composite Protocol by the United States.  
 
74.  The statement goes on to say that we have long held that seeing the actual effects of a 
biological weapons program would be one of the less ambiguous issues in evaluating 
potential threat.  While less ambiguous, such efforts are not unambiguous.  It therefore 
seems to us that being able to examine such effects, including disease outbreaks, was an 
important capability for any Protocol regime.  Attempts to restrict such investigations do 
not seem in the best interests of all parties.  The statement is in direct contradiction to the 
proposals made by the United States in two of its working papers in February 2001 -- for 
example in WP.441, the United States proposed that in the Annex on Field Investigations 
the investigation team should be restricted to an ability to observe visually areas external to 
buildings or other structures  [US proposed addition in bold] and in WP.442 in relation to 
sampling and analysis, the United States proposed restricting the right of the investigation 
team to analyse samples taken during a field investigation by language that the receiving 
State Party shall have the right to take measures...such as requiring the use of specific 
tests or analysis using locally available resources or, if necessary, refuse a sample.  These 
proposals clearly restrict such investigations -- and according to the US statement of 25 July 
2001, do not seem in the best interests of all parties. 
 
 
 
 
I. Conclusion 
 
75.  The statement says that we agree with the  assessment that it was time to move from 
the rolling text to a composite text in an effort to formulate compromise solutions to 
outstanding issues.   We have analyzed those efforts from both a political and substantive 
perspective...   The composite Protocol text is entirely based on the rolling text with 
compromises adopted where necessary to address the remaining differences in views.   
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Consequently, one has to ask why the United States had to wait until the eleventh hour to 
make the statement of 25 July 2001 as there is nothing new in the composite Protocol other 
than solutions to the remaining differences -- and those solutions have taken into 
consideration the views of all States Parties, including the United States, expressed to the 
Chairman during the nine months of informal bilateral consultations that led up to the 
issuing of the composite Protocol text.   It is illogical for the United States in its statement of 
25 July 2001 to reject the approach to the Protocol after almost seven years of negotiation 
during which the United States has spoken strongly in favour of the approach to the Protocol 
both at the Special Conference and subsequently at the Fourth Review Conference and 
elsewhere as already noted in paragraphs 22 to 24 above. 
 
76.  The statement continues to say that the United States does believe that many, if not all, 
of the difficulties I have outlined today are things the participants in this room have heard, 
repeatedly, over the last six years.  These are not new ideas the United States has just now 
formulated -- they are long-standing concerns.  This is simply not borne out by the record -- 
the United States working papers have been much fewer in number than many other 
participants in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations, and those working papers have not addressed 
the difficulties outlined in the statement of 25 July 2001.  Indeed, as noted in paragraph 15 
above, it is well known that the United States has frequently requested a weakening of the 
provisions of the Protocol because of concerns about their implications for the United States.  
Indeed, if the United States had had serious substantive difficulties with the provisions in the 
Protocol -- which have not changed substantively since the Ad Hoc Group transitioned in July 
1997 to consideration of a rolling text as all the elements in that rolling text are still in the 
Chairman's composite Protocol text -- one would have expected the United States to have 
submitted working papers explaining why it has these difficulties and proposing solutions to 
overcome them. 
 
77.   The statement then says that because the difficulties with this text are both serious 
and, in many cases inherent in the very approach used in the text, more drafting and 
modification of this text would, in our view, still not yield a result we could accept.  This is 
yet another illogical conclusion as the work of the Ad Hoc Group throughout has been -- and 
rightly so -- firmly focussed on the mandate agreed by the States Parties including the 
United States at the Special Conference.  This mandate contains the elements proposed  by 
Don Mahley of the United States at the Special Conference for the mandate (see paragraph 
22 above) and endorsed by the United States in the statement made to the Fourth Review 
Conference (see paragraph 23) and in the working paper No 296 cosponsored with 28 other 
States Parties in July 1998 (see paragraph 24). 
 
78.  The statement continues to say that some have argued both publicly and privately that 
not having this Protocol will weaken the BWC itself.  The United States categorically 
rejects that supposition.  Whilst the United States may make such a categorical assertion, 
this does not change the reality of the situation.  In rejecting the Protocol the United States is 
disregarding over a decade of effort around the world that has aimed at strengthening the 
prevention of biological weapons.  Although the BTWC totally prohibits biological 
weapons, it is the weakest of all the prohibition regimes and for that reason, biological 
weapons today present the greatest danger of all weapons of mass destruction.   The United 
States exhortations throughout the statement of 25 July 2001 and elsewhere that it takes the 
challenge of biological weapons seriously and the importance it ascribes to the global ban on 
biological weapons established by the BTWC have a hollow ring indeed when it is realized 
that the United States has rejected the opportunity to significantly strengthen the 
effectiveness of that Convention through the Protocol.   The United States is showing to the 
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world that it is not prepared to explore every avenue or to go the last mile to strengthen the 
regime prohibiting biological weapons.   The net effect and reality is that if the United States 
rejection of the Protocol results in the failure of the Ad Hoc Group to complete the 
negotiations of the Protocol this will undoubtedly weaken the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention as it will send the unequivocal message that the States Parties do not 
care enough about the weaknesses of the Convention to strengthen it through the Protocol. 
 
79.  The statement then concludes by saying that the United States will, therefore, work 
hard to improve -- not lessen -- global efforts to counter both the BW threat and the 
potential impact such weapons could have on civilization.  And we would reply to those 
who cry that not having this Protocol weakens the global norm against BW that there is 
no reason for that kind of reaction to occur.  The United States is failing to recognize what 
the consequences of its rejection of the composite Protocol at the eleventh hour will mean.   
The opportunities to strengthen the regimes against weapons of mass destruction do not 
occur annually but rather in decades.  The negotiation of the Protocol has been the only on-
going arms control negotiation over the past six years and to reject this now means that it 
will be unlikely that there will be any further opportunity to strengthen the biological 
weapons regime for another decade.   It is all very well for the United States to argue that it 
will work hard to improve global efforts -- however, the fact is that the rejection of the 
Protocol by the United States will poison the water and any new proposals, no matter how 
meritable, associated with the United States will be dead on arrival and will be rejected by 
the international community.   The United States in rejecting the Protocol at the eleventh 
hour has effectively isolated itself from the multilateral community -- and any multilateral 
efforts by the United States in the foreseeable future will be regarded with much suspicion 
as the rejection signals yet again that the United States is more concerned about itself than 
about the global community. 
 
Analysis 
 
80.  The United States statement of 25 July 2001 makes a number of assertions and 
exhortations which do not stand up to detailed analysis.   It is evident that the United States 
in rejecting the Protocol is making a huge mistake -- and more to the point -- one that is 
based on illogical assessments.   It is primarily evaluating the Protocol against some national 
standards -- and not against the Protocol mandate that the United States not only agreed to 
but was instrumental in drawing up having proposed many of the elements.  The fact of the 
matter is that the end result of the rejection of the Protocol by the United States is that it will 
not be trusted by other States Parties as a state that lives up to its earlier promises and 
official statements at the highest level.  The damage that this mistrust will cause to 
international security when it involves the world's leading power will be incalculable. 
 
81.  At the same time as, or shortly after, the United States statement of 25 July 2001, a 
number of statements have been made by very senior members of the United States 
administration which indicate there are misunderstandings and misappreciation of the 
composite Protocol by the administration.  For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz on 28 July 2001 said69 that "What is at issue is a 210-page document which 
I doubt any other head of state has even bothered reading which in the name of making the 
treaty more enforceable would actually allow Libyan and Iraqi inspectors to start poking 
around American pharmaceutical companies.  It's ill conceived, and that's the problem." 
                                                 
69Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz interview with CNN, 28 July 2001, 1730. 
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and the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom said70 "After long analysis, we 
have concluded that the protocol will not do the intended job.  We believe, in fact, that it will 
make the world a more dangerous place.  People would labour under a false sense of 
security: our defences would be exposed.... Many nations believe that the proposed protocol 
is badly flawed, but argue that a bad agreement is better than nothing at all."   These 
statements are  incorrect -- there is no provision in the Protocol for national inspectors to 
carry out visits and there is nothing to suggest that the Protocol would make the world a 
more dangerous place -- rather the rejection of the Protocol would make the world a more 
dangerous place.  As to many nations agreeing that the proposed protocol is badly flawed, 
this is not borne out by the statements on 23, 24 and 25 July 2001 by over 50 of the 
approximately 55 States Parties engaged in the negotiations of the Protocol.  Whilst many 
States Parties would have liked to see differences in the compromises adopted in the 
composite Protocol, these States Parties realise, and rightly so, that the composite Protocol 
text has been skillfully crafted so as to provide a Protocol that will achieve the objectives of 
the mandate -- the effective strengthening and improved implementation of the Convention. 
 
82.  The nub of the United States rejection of the Protocol appears to be encapsulated in the 
State Department briefing71 of 25 July 2001 which said "The protocol, which was proposed, 
adds nothing new to our verification capabilities.  And it was the unanimous view in the 
United States government that there were significant risks to US national interests and that 
is why we could not support the protocol.  Implementation of such a protocol would have 
caused problems...for our biological weapons defense programmes, would have risked 
intellectual property problems for our pharmaceutical and biotech industries and risked the 
loss of integrity and utility to our very rigorous multilateral export control regimes."   These 
assertions, as demonstrated above in this Evaluation Paper are all incorrect.    
 
83.  First, the assertion that the composite Protocol adds nothing new to our verification 
capabilities is simply not true.  The Protocol requires mandatory declarations of the activities 
and facilities of greatest relevance to the Convention, the declaration follow-up procedures 
through the randomly-selected transparency visits promote the consistency of declarations 
and address any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission through the tiered declaration 
clarification procedures, have measures to ensure the submission of declarations and also 
provide for field and facility investigations of compliance concerns.  To assert that these add 
nothing new to our verification capabilities fails completely to recognize that there are no 
such provisions under the Convention alone which is completely lacking in any verification 
capabilities. 
 
84.  Second, the assertion that the Protocol would cause problems for the biological weapons 
defense programs of the United States is at complete variance with the assessments of all the 
other States Parties engaged in the negotiations who also have biological weapons defence 
programmes.  Nor is there anything in the Protocol that requires the provision of any 
national security information in the declarations of biological weapons defence programmes.  
Indeed, Article 13 explicitly states that Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as 
impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, 
transfer or use means of protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, 
for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.  This is identical language to that in the 
                                                 
70William S Farish, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States of America, London, The US and the world,  
Letter to the Editor, The Independent, 28 July 2001. 
71 Philip T. Reeker, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Wednesday, 25 July 2001. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/index.cfm?docid=4288 
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Chemical Weapons Convention -- and the United States has not protested that that 
Convention would cause problems for its chemical weapons defence programmes. 
 
85.  Third, the assertion that the Protocol would have risked intellectual property problems 
for the US pharmaceutical and biotech industries ignores the fact that the Protocol contains 
stronger provisions for the protection of commercial proprietary information than did the 
Chemical Weapons Convention when that emerged from its negotiations in Geneva.   
Furthermore, there are no requirements for the provision of commercial proprietary 
information in any of the mandatory declarations.   Furthermore, this assertion ignores the 
fact that under the Chemical Weapons Convention these same pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries may be subjected to inspections -- recognising that there is a continuum between 
chemical and biological agents and that toxins are covered, rightly, by both Conventions.   
The frequency of visits to such facilities in the United States is necessarily seven or less per 
year -- a minute fraction of the numbers of inspections carried out by regulatory agencies in 
the United States. 
 
86.  Fourth, the assertion that the Protocol would have risked the loss of integrity and utility 
to the US very rigorous multilateral export control regimes is simply not true.  Indeed, the 
Protocol includes provisions in Article 7 that require each State Party…to review and, if 
necessary, amend or establish any legislation, regulatory or administrative provisions to 
regulate the transfer of agents, toxins, equipment and technologies relevant to Article III of 
the Convention….  There are thus clear benefits  both in countering proliferation and 
limiting the availability of materials and equipment for bioterrorism   for the international 
community and the United States from this requirement for all States Parties to establish the 
regulation of such transfers.  
 
Conclusions 
 
87.  Conclusions can be drawn from this evaluation of the United States statement of 25 July 
2001 for both the United States and for all the other States Parties engaged in the Ad Hoc 
Group negotiations of the Protocol. 
 
Conclusions for the United States 
 
88.  This evaluation has shown that the rejection of the Chairman's composite Protocol text 
and of the approach adopted in the Protocol by the United States is based on illogical 
assessments.   The rejection is a huge mistake.   The United States is urged to reconsider 
its position.  It should especially take note of the comparison between what the Protocol 
regime will provide and what is available under the Convention alone. 
 
89.  In making this comparison, it is important to remember that the BTWC with its basic 
prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the Protocol is to 
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.  The 
Protocol makes no changes to the basic prohibitions and obligations.  The Protocol regime is 
supplementary and additional to the Convention. It does not undermine the prohibitions in 
Article I, but rather the Protocol safeguards Article I -- a long standing objective of the United 
States and many other States Parties. 
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90.  A tabulation of the principal measures in the regime, compared with the procedures of 
the BTWC alone, clearly brings out the significant benefits from the Protocol which are not 
available from the Convention alone. 
 
BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone 
Mandatory declarations 
  -- measures to ensure submission 
Confidence-Building Measures 
  -- patchy and variable (if made) 
Declaration follow-up procedures 
  -- analysis of declarations 
  -- randomly-selected transparency visits  
None 
  -- none 
  -- none 
Declaration clarification procedures 
  -- clarification visits 
None 
  -- none 
Voluntary assistance visits None 
Non-compliance concerns 
  -- Consultations >>> Investigations 
Art V consultation procedures 
Art VI complaint to UN Security Council 
Field investigation Possible UN Secretary-General investigation if 
invited by State Party concerned 
Facility investigation None 
Transfer procedures None 
Assistance 
  -- provisions detailed  
Art VII assistance if UN Security Council 
decides a Party has been exposed to danger 
International Cooperation  
  -- elaborated in detail 
  -- Cooperation Committee 
Art X provisions 
  -- no implementation procedures 
  -- none 
Organization 
  -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat 
None 
National implementation 
  -- Penal legislation required 
  -- National Authority 
Art IV National implementation 
  -- No penal legislation requirement 
  -- None 
 
91.  Considering all the elements that make up the BTWC Protocol regime as a whole, it is 
clear that there are overall three particularly significant benefits that will accrue from the 
BTWC Protocol regime and which are not available with the Convention alone: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal benefits from the BTWC and its Protocol Regime compared to the BTWC alone. 
 
BTWC and its Protocol Regime BTWC alone 
Measures to increase transparency and build 
confidence 
Suspicions not addressed -- and over time 
reduce international confidence in the regime 
Procedures to address non-compliance 
concerns 
Art V consultations (no teeth) 
Art VI complaints to UN SC (not used) 
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International cooperation and assistance 
provisions enhancing infrastructure, 
transparency and building confidence 
No action despite aspirations at successive 
Review Conferences 
 
92.  The above comparisons show that the Protocol regime brings significant and worthwhile 
benefits to the United States and to all States Parties -- both developed and developing  -- 
over and above the provisions to uphold the basic prohibitions and obligations of the BTWC, 
which remain unchanged.  In addition, the Protocol will be effective, over time, in building 
confidence between States Parties that other States Parties are indeed in compliance with the 
Convention, thereby reinforcing the norm that work on biological weapons, whether directed 
against humans, animals or plants, is totally prohibited.  The international cooperation and 
assistance provisions address a genuine need to counter outbreaks of disease and through 
improvements in infrastructure in areas such as biosafety and good manufacturing practice to 
meet internationally accepted standards bring benefits for health and safety as well as for 
prosperity. The Protocol as a whole thus brings improved health, safety, security and 
prosperity to all States Parties. 
 
93.  In addition the United States needs to reevaluate the gains and costs of signing the 
Composite Protocol compared to the costs and gains of rejecting the Protocol.  In Evaluation 
Paper No 2172, a tabular comparison was provided of the gains and costs of signing compared 
to rejecting the composite Protocol text which is reproduced below for ease of reference. 
Overall conclusions are then drawn about the net value of signing the Composite Protocol -- 
and the net costs of rejecting it.   Before examining the detail in the Table, it is important to 
recognise that there are areas where the interests of States Parties will remain the same 
whether or not they sign the Protocol.  First, there is no change to the total prohibition as all 
States Parties to the Convention have already committed themselves to this undertaking.  
Second, there is no change in the intelligence priorities of any State Party for collection and 
analysis of potential threats.  The main impact of signing the Protocol will be to make 
available to all States Parties, an additional body of information which can be used nationally 
in guiding the employment of national intelligence resources. 
 
94.  The overall conclusions that emerge from examination of the Table are the following: 
 
a.  In signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text, States Parties will be seen to 
have taken all possible practicable multilateral steps to obstruct the proliferation of 
biological weapons. 
 
b.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will reduce the risk of biological 
weapons proliferation and use.  Rejection of the Protocol would send the opposite 
signal and it can be argued that the risk of biological weapons proliferation and use 
will be increased. 
 
c.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will bring significant benefits to 
the infrastructure of States Parties in the areas of combatting infectious disease, 
biosafety and good manufacturing practice and thereby benefits in health, safety and 
prosperity for all States Parties, both developing and developed. 
 
                                                 
72Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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d.  Overall, signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text enhances the security of 
all States Parties.  It provides a net gain to collective security.  Rejection of the 
Protocol misses this opportunity and decreases collective security.  
 
95.  In evaluating the composite Protocol text, it has to be remembered that the BTWC with 
its basic prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the Protocol 
is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.  It is 
evident from the analysis of the principal costs and benefits on an Article by Article basis of 
the composite Protocol that the Protocol will bring significant and worthwhile benefits to all 
States Parties -- both developed and developing.    Furthermore, a consideration in a wider 
perspective shows that signing and ratifying the composite Protocol will bring a net gain for 
all States Parties.  The Protocol will be effective, over time, in increasing transparency and 
building confidence between States Parties that other States Parties are indeed in compliance 
with the Convention, thereby reinforcing the norm that work on biological weapons, whether 
directed against humans, animals or plants, is totally prohibited.  The Protocol will bring 
improved health, safety, security and prosperity to all States Parties. 
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The Costs and Gains from the Composite Protocol 
 
SIGN COMPOSITE PROTOCOL REJECT COMPOSITE PROTOCOL 
GAINS COSTS 
Reinforcement of international norm that 
biological weapons totally prohibited 
No reinforcement of international norm that 
biological weapons totally prohibited  
Risk that norm is weakened as State Party seen 
to have declined opportunity to strengthen 
Deterrence of would-be violator significantly 
enhanced 
Perception  that biological weapons 
unimportant  
Would-be violator encouraged by continued 
international inaction on BTWC 
Increased transparency of activities in other 
States through mandatory declarations 
Confidence-building measure submissions if 
the State decides to submit 
Anomalies, uncertainties and omissions in 
declarations can be addressed 
No means of addressing anomalies, 
uncertainties and omissions 
Mechanisms established to address non-
compliance concerns through investigations 
Continuing ineffective/unused provisions 
(take concerns to UN Security Council) 
All States required to enact penal legislation 
  -- reduced possibility of bioterrorism 
No requirement for penal legislation 
All States required to establish transfer 
controls 
   -- reduced possibility of agent/equipment 
acquisition by States or by non States actors 
 
 
No requirement for establishment of transfer 
controls 
COSTS GAINS 
Costs of Protocol implementation 
-- Modest.   
    International organization half size of 
OPCW  
    National authority could be colocated with 
that for CWC                
-- additional data collection modest compared 
to that for existing CBMs 
 
 
 
Avoidance of cost of Protocol implementation 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
State Party has taken all possible multilateral 
steps to prevent biological weapons 
-- collective security augmented by 
strengthening effectiveness of the BTWC 
State Party lack of interest in multilateral 
world community 
-- sets State Party at variance with collective 
security objectives of the rest of the world 
Reduced risk of BW proliferation Continuing (increased?) BW proliferation risk 
Reduced risk of BW use Continuing (increased?) risk of BW use 
State Party security enhanced Opportunity missed 
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Conclusions for the Other States Parties engaged in the Protocol negotiations 
 
96.  The other States Parties should recognize that the product of their work over a decade of 
negotiations embodied in the Chairman's composite Protocol text would indeed provide an 
effective strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.73   They should 
also recognize that the basis for the rejection of the Protocol by the United States at the 
eleventh hour is unsound as it is based on misperceptions and illogical assessments.  
Consequently, the rejection by the United States should not be seen as providing any basis for 
the other States Parties to abandon the negotiations for a Protocol to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.   Rather, it should be 
recognized that the United States has regrettably during the past decade failed to see the 
benefit of multilateral agreements in many areas ranging from the Convention on Biological 
Diversity which has 181 States Parties74 but not yet the United States, the International 
Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol and the Land Mines Convention.  The Protocol to the 
BTWC is but the latest in what is becoming an ever longer list of international treaties on 
which the United States has chosen to go a different way.   
 
97.  Whilst it would undoubtedly have been preferable to achieve a Protocol with the support 
of the United States, there is no basis to simply abandon efforts because of the United States 
statement rejecting the Protocol.  It has to be remembered that there is nothing new in the Ad 
Hoc Group hearing an individual State Party express its views about the Protocol and the 
negotiations.   The United States statement of 25 July 2001 is but one statement in a series of 
statements that have been made during this session of the Ad Hoc Group.  What is more to 
the point is that there is clearly a majority view expressed by over 50 States Parties -- 
including the other two co-Depositaries -- out of the 55 or so States Parties engaged in the Ad 
Hoc Group that the Chairman's composite Protocol text should form the basis for the political 
decisions to adopt the Protocol by the Fifth Review Conference later this year.  Given that the 
United States statement of 25 July 2001 is so clearly based on illogical assessments, the other 
States Parties should not give it any more credibility than it deserves.  This Evaluation Paper 
has shown that it consists of many assertions which do not stand up to detailed consideration.   
 
98.  Consequently, a single US statement, especially one that is so flawed and based on such 
illogical assessments, is no cause for the other States Parties to abandon their political 
commitment to strengthening the BTWC through the composite Protocol.  It is evident to all 
those that have closely followed the negotiations in Geneva that the composite Protocol is 
both a worthy and well worthwhile product which is supported by all -- or all but one -- 
delegations. 
 
99.  It has always been evident during the negotiations that the United States were not 
showing leadership but rather participating reluctantly with objectives that are unrealistic in 
the global world of the 21st century.  Although following the US statement of 25 July 2001 
there have been some suggestions that the composite Protocol text should be put onto the 
shelf for the time being, one has to ask the question -- for what purpose?  It is very clear that 
if at some future date -- a couple of months, a couple of years or a decade or more hence -- 
the United States indicates that it is ready to give further consideration to a Protocol to 
                                                 
73Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text:  An Effective 
Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, Evaluation Paper No 20, April 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
74Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, as of 9 August 2001.  Available at http://www.biodiv.org/ 
world/parties.asp?lg=0 
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strengthen the Convention, it would be unrealistic not to expect the other States Parties at that 
time not to want to reexamine the provisions in the composite Protocol text and there will 
then be extensive unravelling of what is an excellent package of measures in the Chairman's 
composite text resulting in a net loss of the benefits for health, safety, security and prosperity 
that are available from the Protocol.  The United States statement that it intends to develop 
other ideas and different approaches to effectively strengthen the Convention ignores the 
reality that by having withdrawn from the Protocol at the eleventh hour, the United States has 
effectively killed any favourable multilateral consideration of any ideas, however meritable, 
that it may bring forward at some subsequent date.   Any new proposals, no matter how 
meritable, associated with the United States will be dead on arrival and will be rejected by the 
international community.    There is simply no prospect of any early strengthening of the 
biological weapons multilateral prohibition regime by any means other than the Protocol in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
100.  The other States Parties should go ahead now to take the Chairman's composite 
Protocol text to the United Nations General Assembly and start to bring the Protocol into 
force.  Afterall, given that 65 States Parties have to ratify to achieve entry into force and it 
took the Chemical Weapons Convention, which had the same requirement for 65 States 
Parties to ratify, four years to enter into force, the Protocol is likely to require at least four 
years to reach this point.  This provides time for both the States Parties and for the 
Provisional Technical Secretariat to work on persuading the United States that the Protocol is 
indeed in the best interests of both the United States and international collective security. 
 
101.  The Ad Hoc Group has essentially three options: 
 
A.  To abandon the decade of effort to strengthen the BTWC through a Protocol and 
send the message to the world that, even though the United States statement is based 
on unsound arguments, the other States Parties do not have the political will and 
conviction to help themselves make a significant step forward by adopting the 
Protocol to strengthen the norm against biological weapons.   In other words, despite a 
history of the United States choosing to go a different way in other recent multilateral 
fora, the other States Parties judge that the absence of the United States from this 
negotiation makes it too difficult to reach agreement and that the States Parties simply 
do not care enough about the danger from biological weapons.    
 
B.  To suspend negotiations for a period -- which might be two months, two years or a 
decade.  Realistically, however, this option will result in unravelling of the Protocol 
text and will achieve the same overall result of abandoning the effort to strengthen the 
BTWC through a Protocol. 
 
C.  To recognize that in the Chairman's composite Protocol text, the Ad Hoc Group 
has indeed successfully crafted a Protocol that will effectively strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and to take this 
forward through a resolution to the General Assembly co-sponsored by all those 
States Parties who spoke on 23, 24  and 25 July 2001 in favour of the early 
completion of the Protocol.    
 
The latter option provides real benefits for all States Parties -- both developing and developed 
-- and would enhance global security.  In parallel, the United States should be encouraged to 
reconsider its position and join the Protocol -- but, if the United States does not, then the rest 
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of the world should not miss the opportunity that the Protocol provides for a safer, more 
secure world. 
 
102.  It has long been recognized that there is a window of opportunity now for the 
completion and adoption of the Protocol to the BTWC.  Although the United States 
regrettably is failing to see the benefits of the Protocol for the United States or for global 
security, the other States Parties should have the courage of their convictions and take the 
Chairman's composite Protocol text forward.   History will show that in so doing the other 
States Parties have taken a significant step forward to make the world a safer more secure 
place for all mankind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
